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How Practices Make Principles,
and How Principles Make Rules
Mitchell N. Berman*
January 5, 2022
Abstract: The most fundamental question in general jurisprudence
concerns what makes it the case that the law has the content that it
does. This article offers a novel answer. According to the theory
it christens “principled positivism,” legal practices ground legal
principles, and legal principles determine legal rules. This twolevel account of the determination of legal content differs from
Hart’s celebrated theory in two essential respects: in relaxing
Hart’s requirement that fundamental legal notions depend for
their existence on judicial consensus; and in assigning weighted
contributory legal norms—“principles”—an essential role in the
determination of legal rights, duties, powers, and permissions.
Drawing on concrete examples from statutory and constitutional
law, the article shows how the version of positivism that it
introduces betters Hart’s in meeting the most formidable
challenges to positivism that Dworkin marshaled. In doing so, it
also highlights the legal importance of the abstract jurisprudential
inquiry this article undertakes. Because any argument about what
our law is presupposes an account of what makes it so, domestic
theories of statutory and constitutional interpretation—and the
case-specific holdings they output—are only as secure as are the
general jurisprudential theories they presuppose.

Introduction
What gives law its content? If q is a legal norm, what makes that so? Many
contemporary legal philosophers believe that answering this question is the
discipline’s central task. As David Plunkett and Scott Shapiro recently
urged, without a clear account of “the nature and grounds of legal facts . . .
we won’t have a satisfactory account of how legal reality fits into reality
overall.”1 This article offers a new general account of the determination of
* Leon Meltzer Professor of Law, and Professor of Philosophy, the University of
Pennsylvania. Email: mitchberman@law.upenn.edu. For very helpful conversations or
comments on predecessors to this paper, I am indebted to Tom Adams, Larry Alexander,
Hrafn Asgeirsson, Emad Atiq, Brian Bix, Ruth Chang, Samuele Chilovi, Hanoch Dagan, John

legal content, a novel “constitutive” theory of law. 2 I call this theory
“principled positivism.”
The account is positivist because it maintains that legal norms are
necessarily constituted or determined by the actions and mental states of
persons (or, as some philosophers prefer, by facts about such actions and
mental states), and by moral notions only contingently if at all. However,
and in marked contrast to the reigning positivist theory, that associated with
H.L.A. Hart, my account gives the weighted, contributory norms that the
arch anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin called “principles” a central role in the
determination of legal “rules.” Put in currently favored metaphysical
jargon, legal practices fully ground legal principles, and legal principles
partially ground legal rules.
This paper motivates, explicates, illustrates, and defends principled
positivism. The business occurs over three sections. Section 1 sets the table.
It briefly sketches Hartian positivism and then presents what I consider the
two most formidable challenges to it, both pressed by Dworkin, positivism’s
fiercest critic. The first challenge was raised in Dworkin’s first attack
against Hart’s theory, The Model of Rules I. This objection, which I call the
challenge from principles, maintains that Hartian positivism has difficulty
accounting for the contributory, weighty, and conflicting norms that
Deigh, Mike Dorf, Oran Doyle, Ben Eidelson, David Enoch, John Golden, Mark Greenberg,
Alex Guerrero, Brian Hutler, Felipe Jiménez, Jeffrey Kaplan, Guha Krishnamurthi, Brian
Leiter, Errol Lord, Andrei Marmor, Marcin Matczak, Stephen Perry, David Plunkett, Joseph
Raz, Connie Rosati, Gideon Rosen, Steve Sachs, Larry Sager, Fred Schauer, Steve Schaus,
Stefan Sciaraffa, Scott Shapiro, Rebecca Stone, Kevin Toh, Mark van Roojen, Daniel Wodak,
and workshop audiences at the Oxford Seminars in Jurisprudence, Cornell Law, University
College London, UCLA Law, Penn Philosophy, and the Surrey Centre for Law & Philosophy.
I started work on this paper while serving as a Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at Princeton’s
University Center for Human Values, and gratefully acknowledge the Center’s support.
1 David Plunkett & Scott Shapiro, Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence
as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry, 128 ETHICS 37, 56 (2017). See also, e.g., Scott Hershovitz,
The End of Jurisprudence, 124 YALE L.J. 1160 (2015); Nicos Stavropolous, The Debate That Never
Was, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2082, 2090 (2017); Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, 10 LEGAL
THEORY 157 (2004), reprinted and revised as SCOTT HERSHOVITZ ED., EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE
225, 225 (2006); Kevin Toh, Jurisprudential Theories and First-Order Legal Judgments, 8 PHIL.
COMPASS 457 (2013).
2 See generally Greenberg, supra note 1; David Plunkett, A Positivist Route for Explaining
How Facts Make Law, 18 LEGAL THEORY 139, 149-50 (2012). In describing my theory as
“constitutive,” I am mindful that it has metaphysical connotations that expressivists may
resist. This is a cost, for I intend my account to be congenial to expressivists who will ascribe
truth or correctness conditions to propositions of law, hence are “minimal realists” about the
domain. See infra note __ and accompanying text. On balance, I think it’s a cost worth
incurring, but some will prefer to speak of a theory of legal content or legal correctness,
omitting the “constitutive.”
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Dworkin called legal “principles.” Exactly why, on Dworkin’s analysis,
Hart’s account cannot accommodate principles is largely misunderstood.
Drawing on a companion article,3 I explain that the crux of the challenge is
not that Hart’s account can’t deliver legal principles, but that, insofar as it
can, it can’t deliver legal rules.
Dworkin developed his second challenge in work that followed TMR I,
most insistently when speaking as an American constitutional theorist. This
second objection maintains that, because of pervasive disagreements among
U.S. justices and judges about matters of “constitutional interpretation,”
vastly fewer putative legal norms are “valid,” or “exist,” than sophisticated
observers and participants believe, on reflection, there to be. I dub this
objection the too-little-law challenge. It is kin to a much better known
objection, the challenge from theoretical disagreements, that, I will explain,
Hart’s theory rebuts easily.
Section 2 introduces an alternative to, or modification of, Hartian
positivism designed to meet the challenges from principles and of too-little
law. The two key moves are to allow for the determination of nonfundamental (i.e., derivative) legal norms by a means that does not require
Hartian “validation,” and to allow for the determination (or “grounding”)
of fundamental legal norms in practices that fall far short of judicial
consensus. In presenting an account that has these twin virtues, this Part
explains: (1) how “legally fundamental” weighted norms can be grounded
directly in the messy, conflictual human practices that characterize modern,
vast, decentralized legal systems; (2) how such principles can interact or
combine by non-lexical, aggregative means to determine the legal status of
token acts and events; and (3) how the “decisive” and general legal norms
customarily called “rules” fit into the picture.
Section 3 puts my account to work, showing how it meets Dworkin’s
challenges. It does so with the aid of three concrete disputes from American
statutory and constitutional law: the “snail darter case” 4 that Dworkin
discusses at length in Law’s Empire; the constitutional right to recognition of
same-sex marriage announced in Obergefell v. Hodges; 5 and a state’s
constitutional power to penalize “faithless electors,” unanimously
approved in Chiafalo v. Washington.6
_____________

3 Mitchell N. Berman, Dworkin versus Hart Revisited: The Challenge of Non-Lexical
Determination, __ OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. __ (forthcoming 2022).
4 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
5 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
6 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020).

3

This Article principally contributes to general jurisprudence, not
American constitutional law or theory. But as Section 3 makes clear, the
disciplines are not crisply separable. That was one of Dworkin’s core
insights, memorably pronouncing jurisprudence “the general part of
adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law.”7 Consistent with that
teaching, leading proponents of living constitutionalism have long
presented their theories as depending upon (and extending) Dworkin’s
anti-positivist general theory of law. 8 Perhaps more arresting is the
increasingly vocal insistence on the same point from the positivist side.
Scott Shapiro, for example, motivated his own positivist alternative to
Hart—his “planning theory” of law—by hammering at the “profound
practical difference” that philosophical theories of legal content make.
Because “American lawyers do not all agree with one another about the
correct way to interpret the Constitution,” he observed with modest
understatement, the only way to resolve such disputes “is to know which
facts ultimately determine the content of all law.”9 Similarly, the prominent
originalists William Baude and Stephen Sachs have been vigorously
championing a “positive turn” 10 in our interpretive debates precisely
because “an account of legal interpretation ought to be responsible to a
theory of law.”11 So unless originalists take their project to be one of law
reform, they explain, the question they should be examining is not whether
originalism would lead to good results but whether it’s “our law,” a matter
that, inescapably, “depends in part on principles of abstract
jurisprudence.”12
The point is simple: insofar as the jurisprudential intervention this
Article undertakes is successful, implications for American legal
interpretive theory inevitably follow. Drawing forth and defending those
implications is not today’s business. But readers whose interest in
jurisprudence derives largely from its character as “prologue” will naturally
wonder at what might be to come. What lies downstream is a major payoff:
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (1986).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004); JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION
(2015).
9 SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 28-29 (2011).
10 William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2015); see also,
e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1116
(2017); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
817, 819 (2015).
11 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455,
1460 (2019) (paraphrasing a remark by Mark Greenberg in an unpublished paper).
12 Id. at 1457.
7
8
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a solid jurisprudential foundation for a positivist, pluralist, and nonoriginalist constitutive theory of American constitutional law.

1. Hartian Positivism and Two Dworkinian Challenges
This Article could possibly start where Section 2 does—with a presentation
of the account I call principled positivism. But that account emerges within
a tradition. And if it boasts any distinctive virtues, they can be grasped only
with an understanding of the theoretical dialectic. This section supplies the
necessary context.
Section 1.1 sketches the Hartian account of legal content,13 emphasizing
the ultimate rule of recognition’s character as a social practice that grounds
“fundamental” legal norms—the “ultimate criteria of validity”—and the
role of those criteria in “validating” the legal norms that are “derivative.”
The remainder of the section identifies the most daunting obstacles that
account faces. Section 1.2 introduces the most forceful challenge pressed by
the early Dworkin: the “challenge from principles” lodged in “The Model
of Rules I.”14 Despite common wisdom that Hartians have successfully
rebutted that challenge, 15 I will argue that such optimism is based on a
misunderstanding of Dworkin’s argument, and that the challenge remains
unrefuted. 16 Section 1.3 introduces the “challenge from theoretical
disagreements” from Law’s Empire. The situation here is almost the reverse

I say “Hartian,” not “Hart’s,” because I’m less focused on what Hart himself believed
or intended (see generally, of course, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994)), and
more on the tradition that bears his name, especially in light of current jurisprudential
thinking. Most notably, I’m assuming that the criteria of validity grounded in the rule of
recognition validate derivative legal norms, not only their sources, even though it is uncertain
whether Hart himself understood his apparatus to perform this function. See, e.g., Jeremy
Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Recognition?, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 327, 336 (Matthew Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds. 2009). The assumption
I indulge is more productive, for if the criteria of validity picked out only legal sources, and
did not address the derivation of law from those sources, it would be patently inadequate as
a theoretical account of legal content. And while that observation need not amount to a
criticism of Hart—providing an account of legal content was not his primary goal, if one at
all—it has obvious bearing for any current-day scholar who is interested in legal content.
14 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), reprinted and revised
as The Model of Rules I, in RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ch. 2 (1977).
Subsequent citations will be to the book.
15 See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in
RONALD DWORKIN 35 (Arthur Ripstein ed. 2007).
16 This is the main work of Berman, supra note 3. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 summarize
arguments developed at greater length in that article.
13
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of the first challenge: although prominent scholars think it robust, I think it
weak. Section 1.4 turns to a rarely discussed cousin to the challenge from
theoretical disagreements, what I call the too-little law challenge. I argue that
it’s the later Dworkin’s most formidable objection. This Section’s takeaway
is that positivists must still engage with and defeat the challenge from
principles and the challenge of too-little-law.
1.1. From socio-normative positivism to Hartian legal positivism
Before we even get to legal norms, let’s talk social norms. Before the
Covid-19 pandemic, norms in most Western cultures directed that one
should greet a new acquaintance by shaking hands. A norm obtains among
many law students that one ought not to volunteer to answer an instructor’s
questions. A norm in some communities in the American Midwest enjoins
a guest to decline a host’s offer twice before accepting. Common theoretical
wisdom about such norms includes three elements: (1) minimal realism (the
“metaphysically unambitious” thesis that “there really are ways that things
might be . . . and that our thoughts and sentences do sometimes correctly
represent that reality”); 17 (2) thin normativity (the view that these norms
exhibit or exert a type or grade of normativity different in character or
stringency from moral norms as conceived by traditional or “robust” moral
realists, and are not “truly” or “unconditionally” binding; 18 and (3)
positivism (the idea that these norms are metaphysically determined by
certain behaviors and mental states (or by facts about those behaviors and
mental states) undertaken by some members of the social groups to which
the norms apply).
In accord with currently popular philosophical vocabulary, I will say
that such norms are “grounded in” social practices, where grounding is a
relationship of metaphysical determination by which more fundamental
facts or entities explain, non-causally, less fundamental ones. 19 For
MARK VAN ROOJEN, METAETHICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 9-14 (2015).
This is the type of normativity that attaches to rules of etiquette and rules of a club, as
famously explored in Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL.
REV. 305 (1972). For elaboration, see my Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in
DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY 137, 143-44 (David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro & Kevin Toh eds.,
2019); see also, e.g., Stephen Finlay, Defining Normativity, in DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY,
supra, at 187; Daniel Wodak, What Does ‘Legal Obligation’ Mean, 99 PAC. PHIL. Q. 790 (2018).
19 Grounding is a hot topic in metaphysics, but controversial and very unsettled. I intend
to remain as noncommittal on issues in dispute as possible. That said, I will generally take
the grounding relata to be entities such as speech acts, practices and artificial norms, not facts
about speech acts, practices, or artificial norms. Compare, e.g., Gideon Rosen, Metaphysical
Dependence: Grounding and Reduction, in MODALITY: METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, AND EPISTEMOLOGY
109 (Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann eds., 2010) (facts) with Jonathan Schaffer, On What Grounds
17
18
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example: physical, neurochemical states of the brain ground mental
phenomena such as beliefs, intentions, and pain; microphysical properties
such as molecular structure ground macrophysical properties such as
hardness and conductivity.
Figure 1 depicts the determination of social norms by “social practices,”
a term I intend to be vague and capacious in two ways. First, by “practices,”
I mean to embrace a potentially broad range of behaviors and
accompanying mental states, such as believing and stating that the standard
a norm captures is normative, using it to guide and justify one’s own
conduct, criticizing oneself and others for deviance, and so on. Second, by
“social,” I mean to signal only that the practices are engaged in by
(significant portions of) some identifiable subset of society, and not that
they must be found through all of society. Similarly, I designate the
grounding relationship simply “G1,” leaving its details entirely open.20
Social norms model (fig. 1)
Social norms

G1

Social practices

For a legal positivist, complex institutionalized normative systems
including law exhibit these same three properties.
EU securities
regulations, offside rules in soccer, Jewish dietary laws—they’re all
minimally realist, only thinly normative, and grounded in social practices
or facts.21
What, in METAMETAPHYSICS: NEW ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF ONTOLOGY 347 (David
Chalmers, David Manley, & Ryan Wasserman, eds., 2009) (not facts). But I’m not doctrinaire
about this. When it facilitates exposition, I will sometimes speak about the grounding facts.
I trust that nothing of substance in my argument depends on adopting one or another
position on this particular intramural controversy.
20 See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN ET AL., EXPLAINING NORMS 35 (2013) (“norms . . . are
clusters of normative attitudes plus knowledge of those attitudes”); CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE
GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS ix (2006) (“norms are
supported by and in some sense consist of a cluster of self-fulfilling expectations”).
21 For the view that legal positivists should, and Hart did, accept minimal realism about
legal norms see MATTHEW H. KRAMER, H.L.A. HART 30-31, 192-93 (2018). True, Hart did not
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There is, however, one critical difference. All social norms are grounded
directly in social facts: q is not a social norm of community S if not the object
of some supportive practices.22 Things are different in complex systems: at
least some norms of such systems are not taken up by participants and
might be entirely unknown to them. As Baude and Sachs note, “we can be
surprised by, mistaken about, or disobedient toward the law without it
ceasing to be law.” 23 So if legal norms are grounded in social facts, the
mechanism by which facts determine law must be indirect, at least
sometimes. The central task for positivist theories of law is to explicate the
indirect grounding relationship that yields legal norms consistent with a
scientific picture of the world.24 This is a project in social ontology, itself a
branch of metaphysics.
A natural thought is that, if a positivist model of complex normative
systems including law is to prove viable, it would likely involve two levels
of determination where the generic positivist model of social norms
recognizes only one. On this positivist model of law, social practices ground
fundamental legal norms, by G1 or a close analogue, and fundamental legal
norms, together with whatever facts, practices, or phenomena the
fundamental legal norms “point to” or otherwise make legally relevant,
determine derivative legal norms, by a mechanism or relation D2. (Figure
2.) The fundamental legal norms that are directly grounded in social
practices function as “normative intermediaries” in the determination of
legal norms that are not directly grounded in such practices. For example,
suppose that a fundamental legal norm, F, of legal system S provides that r
speak in terms of “grounding” (it was not part of the then-prevailing philosophical lexicon),
and some legal positivists would eschew that vocabulary even today. A more precise
statement would be that all legal positivists believe that law is determined by social practices
or facts—and not by moral facts or norms except insofar as social practices so direct—and
that many, whom I join, think that “grounding” is the relevant type of determination
relationship. Accord Samuele Chilovi & George Pavlakos, The Explanatory Demands of
Grounding in Law, __ PACIFIC PHIL. Q __ (forthcoming), at 1 (listing authorities “[f]or the view
that positivism is best interpreted as a grounding thesis”).
22 As Cristina Bicchieri cautions, this does not mean that a social norm must be heeded to
exist. Even if all members of a normative community S secretly flout q, q can still be a social
norm of S so long as the members engage in such norm-supportive behaviors as urging
others to comply with q, or criticizing others (or themselves) for noncompliance. BICCHIERI,
supra note __, at 11.
23 Baude & Sachs, Grounding Originalism, supra note __, at 1473. See also Brian H. Bix,
Global Error and Legal Truth, 29 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 535 (2009); Stephen E. Sachs, The
“Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253 (2014).
24 See Plunkett & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 49 (arguing that jurisprudence is a branch of
metanormative inquiry, and that metanormative theory in general is concerned with
explaining “how thought, talk, and reality that involve [normative notions] fit into reality”).
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is a legal rule of S if r corresponds to a specified type of communicative
content of a specified type of text.25 And suppose that T is a text of the
specified type and that its relevant communicative content is q. Then q’s
existence as a derivative legal rule of S is jointly determined by F and the
communicative content of T.26
Generic two-level legal positivism (fig. 2)
Fundamental
legal norms

Legally relevant
phenomena

D2

D2

Derivative
legal norms

G1

Legal practices

25 Notice that F in this example functions more as a constitutive rule, see generally JOHN
R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 33-34 (1969), than as a regulative rule. It serves to make something
the case and not to require, direct, or prohibit conduct. Persons who believe that every norm
is an ought, and thus that a notion or operator must purport to have action-guiding character
to count as a “norm,” see, e.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Understanding the Relationship Between
the U.S. Constitution and the Conventional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note __, 95, at 98, will resist my characterization of F as a legal
norm. My linguistic intuitions about “norms” are more expansive and embrace elements or
concepts within the normative domain, or that bear specified relationships to norms that
have a directive or deontic character. But this is a semantic dispute that need not detain us.
If you’d withhold the term “norm” from an abstract entity whose function is to determine
the content of action-guiding entities but not to guide action directly, you might call F and
its kin “shnorms” or “auxiliaries to norms.” The substantive points I am making remain
unaffected.
26 Philosophers debate whether grounding is a single type of metaphysical
determination, a group of related types, or just a comprehensive label for varied kinds of
already recognized determination relationships. See generally Selim Berker, The Unity of
Grounding, 127 MIND 729 (2018). I am myself more persuaded that grounding is a genuine
type of determination, and one that obtains between practices and norms, than I am that the
determination of derivative legal norms by fundamental legal norms and the phenomena
that they make relevant is also best conceived in terms of grounding. I signal the possibility
of important differences in the two determination mechanisms by referring to the latter
relationship as simply “determination”—denominated D2 rather than G2—and by
representing D2 with a horizontal arrow rather than a vertical one, departing from the
convention according to which grounding is represented vertically.
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The account that Hart presented in his masterwork, The Concept of Law,
is easily understood as one way to put flesh on this skeletal legal positivist
model. On a common interpretation, Hart holds that it is the nature of a
legal system that legal norms have the legal contents or significance that
they do in virtue of being validated by a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions or “criteria” that are grounded in a convergent practice among
officials, chiefly judges, of norm acceptance. Officials accept a norm by
conforming their behavior to it with the critical reflective attitude that Hart
dubs the “internal point of view.”27 The convergent practice itself is the
“ultimate rule of recognition.” On this reading, Hart’s account is a
specification of generic two-level legal positivism in three respects. First,
Hart replaces the vague generic reference to “legal practices” with his
signature theoretical innovations the internal point of view and ultimate
rule of recognition. Second, he conceptualizes the “fundamental legal
norms” that are grounded in practice as “ultimate criteria of validity.” 28
Third, and working hand in glove with the second, he posits that the
determination mechanism is “validation.” (See figure 3.)29

See generally HART, supra note __, at 100-17. See also, e.g., Grant Lamond, The Rule of
Recognition and the Foundations of a Legal System, in READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF LAW
97, 114 (Luis Duarte D’Almeida, James Edwards & Andrea Dolcetti eds. 2013). (“Of course,
the language of ‘recognition’ and ‘identification’ is not entirely apt: what the rule of
recognition does is to constitute the rules as rules of the system, that is, it makes them rules of
the system.”).
28 Scholars frequently use the term “rule of recognition” (often omitting the modifier
“ultimate”) to refer both to the social rule among judges of accepting criteria of legal validity
and to the criteria themselves. Hart himself did not adhere to the distinction consistently.
See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 359 (1983) (agreeing with
Lon Fuller that the ultimate rule of recognition could be deemed “a political fact,” but
insisting that “[t]he propriety of this . . . description [does] not exclude the classification of
this phenomenon as an ultimate legal rule”). Still, I am persuaded that clarity is enhanced
by keeping the notions separate, as I attempt to do here. (I am grateful to Brian Leiter for
doing the persuading.)
29 For a similar analysis of Hart’s account in terms of grounding, see Samuele Chilovi &
George Pavlakos, Law-determination as Grounding: A Common Grounding Framework for
Jurisprudence, 25 LEGAL THEORY 53, 71-74 (2019). I explain the modest differences between
our accounts in Berman, supra note 3, at __ n. 41.
27
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Hartian legal positivism: first pass (fig. 3)
Ultimate criteria
of validity

Legally relevant
phenomena

D2 validation

Derivative
legal norms

G1

Near-consensus
judicial
acceptance (The
“ultimate rule
of recognition”)

1.2. A problem for validation: the challenge from principles
Many legal theorists today accept the foregoing picture, at least in broad
strokes. Ronald Dworkin did not. His target in the paper that would come
to be known as the “The Model of Rules I” was legal positivism. His
strategy was to demonstrate that positivism’s most fully realized version,
Hart’s, could not make sense of legal principles as a logically distinct type
of norm.
On this much all agree. But that’s about it. It’s not merely that
commentators disagree about whether the challenge from principles (as I term
it) succeeds. As is often the case when it comes to Dworkin exegesis, they
do not all agree on exactly how the challenge even runs. I unpack
Dworkin’s argument at length elsewhere.30 This section summarizes.
Standard understanding of Dworkin’s argument starts with his
proposed distinction between rules and principles. “Rules,” Dworkin
explains, “are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule
stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer
it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing
to the decision.”31 Principles, in contrast, bear on a decision with variable
“weight or importance,” and are not decisive. Principles “incline a decision
one way, though not conclusively, and they survive intact when they do not
prevail.”32 The problem for Hartian positivism is that it is a “model of rules”
Berman, Dworkin versus Hart Revisited, supra note __, at __.
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 24.
32 Id. at 35.
30
31
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alone, not of principles as well. This is because Hart allows for legal norms
to arise in only two ways: by being validated, in accordance with the criteria
of validity, or by being the subject of convergent acceptance by officials,
centrally judges. But, says Dworkin, principles cannot arise in either of
these two ways. Principles cannot be determined by validation because
they don’t depend upon specifiable sufficient conditions; they cannot be
validated by any “test that all (and only) the principles that do count as law
meet.”33 Nor can they arise by acceptance because that would reduce the
scope and significance of the rule of recognition; it “would very sharply
reduce that area of the law over which [Hart’s] master rule held any
dominion.” 34 Therefore, Hart’s theory cannot accommodate legal
principles.
As early critics of the essay showed, this argument is infirm in several
respects.35 While some flaws might be massaged away, many readers were
wholly unpersuaded by what they took to be Dworkin’s core thesis—
namely, that legal principles cannot “come into being” either (directly) by
being accepted or (indirectly) be being validated. 36 To the contrary,
commentators thought it apparent that they can arise in both ways. Take
validation first.37 Suppose the criteria of validity specified in the ultimate
rule of recognition provide that [q is a legal norm if text T says q], and
suppose further that what T says, among things, is that “states should be
paid special regard.” It’s not at all clear why that conjunction of facts would
not validate some legal principle of federalism, the contours of which would
be determined in common law fashion. Next take acceptance. Given that
Hart allows that customary law can also be law in virtue of being accepted,
there is no obvious bar in Hart’s theory to principles being accepted too.38
DWORKIN, supra note __, at 40.
Id. at 43.
35 For one thing, Dworkin offered two stabs at the distinction between rules and
principles, not one. In addition to distinguishing rules and principles on the basis of their
logical character, Dworkin also offered a substantive (or “normative”) difference: principles
concern “justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.” DWORKIN, supra note __,
at 22. However, the scholarly consensus is that “Dworkin’s two accounts of principles do
not mesh,” David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 423 (1977),
and that, if there is a distinction here, it resides in the vicinity of Dworkin’s “logical”
difference. For another, it appears probable that rules can conflict and have variable weight
or importance. E. Philip Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Debate, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473, 479-84 (1977); Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law,
81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972).
36 DWORKIN, supra note __, at 20.
37 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note __, at 425; C.L. Ten, The Soundest Theory of Law, 88 MIND 522,
524 (1979); HART, supra note __, at 261, 264-65.
38 Raz, supra note __, at 853.
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Figure 4 represents the Hartian model as tweaked or clarified to respond to
Dworkin’s challenge: derivative legal principles can be validated by the
ultimate criteria of validity; and just like those ultimate criteria,
fundamental legal principles could also be directly grounded in the
practices that Hart calls acceptance.
Hartian legal positivism: response to Dworkin (fig. 4)
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These are all sound criticisms. And yet, even though Dworkin didn’t
fully corral his quarry, many theorists think that he was on the right track.39
The task, if so, is to make clearer what he was up to.
Although Dworkin highlights his claim that Hartian positivism cannot
explain the existence of legal principles, the true force of his argument, I
think, is that it cannot explain their function or operation. As figure 4
indicates, the Hartian account, as modified to meet the challenge from
See, e.g., Dale Smith, Dworkin’s Theory of Law, PHIL. COMPASS 267, 268 (2007) (“While
many positivists thought that [Dworkin] over-stated or misunderstood the difference
between rules and principles, most accepted that there is a difference between these two
types of norm.”); Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 739,
745 (1997) (observing that the Dworkinian distinction between rules and principles reflects
“an entire jurisprudential tradition, a tradition that has shaped not only academic thought
on these matters but also how lawyers and judges think and operate”) (first published in
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 279 (Andrei Marmor ed. 1995));
HUMBERTO ÁVILA, THEORY OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES (2007).
39
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principles, represents rules and principles (both fundamental and
derivative) as co-existing in parallel, more or less. In the words of the
inclusive positivist David Lyons, “principles supplement rules.” 40 But
principles have a function, which is to contribute to rules, not (merely) to
supplement them; their role is to help determine the rules that are not
themselves grounded in official acceptance.41 And they do so in a manner
that the rule of recognition cannot accommodate: “rules . . . owe their force
at least in part to the authority of principles . . . , and so not entirely to the
master rule of recognition.”42
Unfortunately, Dworkin does not spell out precisely why determination
of derivative rules by principles cannot be governed by the ultimate rule of
recognition. The answer emerges when we attend to the mode by which
that rule and its associated criteria of validity operate. The entire rule of
recognition apparatus determines derivative legal norms in a rule-like
way—by validating them. But, as Stephen Perry encapsulated Dworkin’s
analysis, “the bindingness of a legal rule is nothing more than the collective
normative force of the principles.” 43 And, intuitively, determination by
aggregative force seems very different from determination by validation.
That intuition is well supported. Start with the treatment of moral
principles in moral philosophy. As Jonathan Dancy has observed, “there
seem to be two ways of . . . getting a determinate answer to the question of
what to do” when the principles that contribute to a decision conflict. One
way “is to rank our principles lexically”; the other is “to think of principles
as having some sort of weight” and adding them up. “These two ways are
different.”44 Or turn to legal practice, where a similar difference obtains
between multi-factor balancing tests and lexically ordered tests, often called
“rules.” Whereas the conditions or criteria that make up a rule-like test
dictate results by validation or something very similar, the factors that go
into a balancing test combine or aggregate to dictate the legally proper
Lyons, supra note __, at 421.
This way of putting things assumes that principles form part of a theory of legal
content and not only of a theory of adjudication. Dworkin spoke in both registers while
being notoriously cavalier about the difference.
42 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 43; see also id. at 77 (“the rules governing adverse possession
may even now be said to reflect the principle [that nobody may profit from his own wrong]
. . . because these rules have a different shape than they would have had if the principle had
not been given any weight in the decision at all”); id. at 37 (“Unless at least some principles
are acknowledged to be binding upon judges, requiring them as a set to reach particular
decisions, then no rules, or very few rules, can be said to be binding on them either.”).
43 Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 215, 225 (1987).
44 JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES 25 (2004).
40
41
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result in a manner that eschews sufficient conditions and resists
specification. Last—a little farther afield, but very revealing—consider the
difference between two accounts of conceptual “structure”:45 the “classical”
account that views concepts as definable by a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, and the “cluster” account pursuant to which multiple criteria
“count towards” or “bear upon” a concept’s proper application in a given
case, without any of the criteria being necessary or sufficient.
Generalizing from these diverse examples, we can distinguish two
families of determination relationships, two general ways that determinants
map onto resultants, or that grounded facts are grounded in grounding
facts. One family centrally involves such notions and operations as “if . . .
then,” necessity, and sufficiency. The other revolves around different
notions, prominently including “greater than/less than,” contribution, and
thresholds. In the absence of a well-settled nomenclature, but following
Dancy, let’s call these contrasting determination classes “lexical” and “nonlexical.”
The punchline is plain. “To say that a given rule is valid,” Hart explains,
“is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition
. . . . [A] statement that a particular rule is valid means that it satisfies all
the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.”46 Consistent with this and
other scattered remarks, many scholars treat Hartian validation as a process
or function by which resultants are determined by satisfaction of a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions.47 That could be quibbled with: there is
reason to doubt that validation need involve necessary conditions at all, and
even supposedly sufficient conditions are not truly “sufficient” given Hart’s
embrace of defeasibility. But nailing down Hartian validation with
precision is not essential here. What’s clear is this: whatever exactly it
involves, validation is a quintessentially lexical determination structure.
Equally clear is that, if there is any merit to the lexical/non-lexical
distinction, principles do not operate lexically; their cumulative impact
cannot be specified by a finite or tractable set of criteria. That is the point of
insisting on their weightedness. So even if principles could be grounded in
judicial practice (as Dworkin denies), those principles combine to constitute
See Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward Zalta ed.).
46 HART, supra note __, at 103.
See also H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY 359 (1983).
47 See, e.g., Raz, supra note __, at 851; Kenneth Einar Himma, Understanding the
Relationship Between the U.S. Constitution and the Conventional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE
OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note __, at 96; DWORKIN, supra note 7, at
62.
45
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rules, and because their means of doing so is messy, cumulative, and nonlexical, rules are not validated.48 The surprising upshot of the challenge from
principles, then, is not that Hart’s account can’t accommodate legal
principles; it’s that, thanks to the existence of fundamental legal principles
and the non-lexical determination relationship that obtains between
principles and rules, Hart’s account can’t explain legal rules. Timothy
Endicott hit the nail on the head: “What really kills the model of rules in
Dworkin’s theory is not the proposition that there are some legal standards
not identifiable by reference to a rule of recognition, but the proposition that
all legal standards depend on standards that are not identifiable by
reference to a rule of recognition.” 49 Thus, the core of Dworkin’s multiprong challenge from principles is the challenge of non-lexical determination. It
is to explain how derivative legal rules can be partially determined by
principles and not (only) by validation. That challenge remains unrebutted.
1.3. A false problem for consensus: “theoretical disagreements”
Although positivists had not succeeded in blunting, or even fully
grasping, his challenge from principles, by Law’s Empire, Dworkin had
fastened on a new leading argument against positivism, one that, like his
first, does not depend upon the success of his own anti-positivist account of
law. The target of his earlier challenge, to repeat, was Hart’s spin on the
determination relationship that links fundamental and derivative legal
norms—namely, that it involves validation, which is a lexical operation.
Dworkin’s new target was Hart’s account of the practices—the ultimate rule
of recognition—that ground the criteria of validity that function as a
fundamental legal norm. Hart makes clear that the rule of recognition
depends upon a very substantial degree of judicial agreement on the criteria
As the philosophers Errol Lord and Barry Maguire have recently argued, any
normative theory must recognize “two central cross-cutting distinctions”: the distinction
between “strict” and “non-strict” notions, and a second between “weighted” and “nonweighted” notions. Typically, non-strict notions are weighted and weighted notions help
explain the strict. Errol Lord & Barry Maguire, An Opinionated Guide to the Weight of Reasons,
in WEIGHING REASONS 3-4 (Errol Lord & Barry Maguire eds. 2016). Put in their vocabulary,
Dworkin’s principles are weighted, non-strict notions whose function is to contribute to a
strict or decisive normative status, whereas rules are strict or decisive notions by nature,
whose function is to deliver decisive verdicts all by themselves (even if the decisive verdicts
they purport to deliver are countermanded by others).
49 Timothy Endicott, Are there any Rules?, 5 J. ETHICS 199, 203-04 (2001) (emphasis
omitted); see also MICHAEL D. BAYLES, HART’S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: AN EXAMINATION 167 (1992)
(contending that Dworkin’s “most telling argument for principles binding judges is that if
they do not, rules cannot be binding either,” but also complaining that “Dworkin’s
formulation of the issue is puzzling”).
48
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it picks out: “what is crucial is that there should be a unified or shared
official acceptance.”50 Dworkin advanced two closely related arguments
against this premise: the challenge from theoretical disagreements, and the
challenge of too-little law. This section and the next tease these challenges
apart and argue that the former, while well-known and much engaged by
scholars, scores no points against Hart, but that the latter, though largely
ignored, has far greater force.
According to the new challenge from theoretical disagreements, positivists
are supposedly unable to make sense of disagreements among jurists about
what the proximate grounds of derivative legal norms are, as distinguished
from disagreements about whether those grounds obtain in a given case.
They cannot make sense of such disagreements because, says Dworkin,
positivism endorses “the ‘plain fact’ view of the grounds of law”51 pursuant
to which, as Shapiro puts it, “the grounds of law in any community are fixed
by consensus among legal officials.” 52 Because “questions of law can
always be answered by looking in the books where the records of
institutional decisions are kept,” and because legal actors must be taken to
know this to be true, the existence of genuine theoretical legal
disagreements is unintelligible on positivist premises.53 Put in the Hartian
vocabulary, Hart’s account, argues Dworkin, cannot make sense of
disagreements about what the criteria of validity are, as opposed to
disagreements about whether some criterion is satisfied.
Dworkin introduces the “snail darter case,” TVA v. Hill, to illustrate. I’ll
examine this case in greater depth later (Section 3.1), but the basics are
enough for now. The case concerns interpretation of the federal
Endangered Species Act (ESA), in particular whether the ESA required that
construction of a nearly completed dam, for which millions of public dollars
had already been expended, be terminated. The majority, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Warren Burger, held that it did. Justice Lewis Powell, for
himself and Justice Harry Blackmun, held that it did not.
As Dworkin reads the opinions, the disagreement between Burger and
Powell flows from the “very different” theories “of legislation” that they
adopt:
Burger said that the acontextual meaning of the text should be
enforced, no matter how odd or absurd the consequences, unless
the court discovered strong evidence that Congress actually
HART, supra note __, at 115.
DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 7.
52 Shapiro, supra note __, at 37.
53 DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 7.
50
51
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intended the opposite. Powell said that the courts should accept an
absurd result only if they find compelling evidence that it was
intended.54
This disagreement, Dworkin emphasized, is entirely “about the question of
law; they disagreed about how judges should decide what law is made by
a particular text enacted by Congress when the congressmen had the kinds
of beliefs and intentions both justices agreed they had in this instance.”55
His conclusion: this type of disagreement is unintelligible if Hart’s theory is
correct. A model that grounds law in official consensus is incompatible with
the existence of genuine and sincere disagreements about legal
fundamentals.
To understand the argument better, and see where it goes awry, a touch
of formality might help. Burger’s premise (according to Dworkin) is that q
is the law if [(q is the meaning of a statute) and (the legislature did not
intend ¬q)]. Powell’s competing premise holds that q is the law if [(¬q
would be absurd) and ¬(the legislature intended ¬q)]. For expositional ease,
we can use variables to stand in for each complex validating criterion (what
follows the “if”). Thus: the majority believed [q is the law if CM]; Justice
Powell believed [q is the law if CP]. Dworkin’s argument runs as follows:
(P1) Burger avers honestly: [q is the law if CM]
(P2) If Hartian positivism is true, then [q is the law if CM] iff almost all
judges agree that [q is the law if CM]
(P3) Powell and Blackmun aver honestly: ¬[q is the law if CM]
(P4) Hartian positivism is true
(C1) ¬[q is the law if CM] (from (P2), (P3), (P4))
(P5) Burger believes (P2), (P3), and (P4)
(C2) Burger believes ¬[q is the law if CM] (from (P5))
(C3) Therefore, Burger does not aver honestly: [q is the law if CM] (from
(C2))56
Dworkin’s conclusion: we can dispel the contradiction between (P1) and
(C3) by abandoning (P4), Hart’s theory of legal content.
One possible Hartian response is to reject (P1). Maybe Burger did not
honestly believe the claim he advanced about “the grounds of law,” i.e.,
about “the criteria of validity.” But victory won this way is hollow. Burger

DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note __, at 23.
Id.
56 The same argument goes through, as an argument about Powell rather than Burger, if
we replace (P1) with (P1*) Powell avers honestly: [q is the law if C P], and then substitute as
necessary throughout.
54
55
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aside (and Powell too), it surely seems that genuine and sincere theoretical
disagreements are possible, and even actual. We believe that there are other
cases with this structure in which the conflicting avowals are both honest.
The deeper difficulty with the challenge is that (P5), which is essential
to the conclusion, attributes beliefs to Burger (or to any judge) that might
not be warranted. In particular, the premise [Burger believes (P2)] follows
from a more general proposition that Hart does not stipulate: that those who
are disagreeing know (or believe) that q is a legal norm if and only if the
fundamental legal notions are the subject of judicial consensus. Whether
judicial near-consensus grounds legal rules and whether participants know
this to be true are separate questions. Hart’s theory explicitly asserts the
former, but not the latter.
So Dworkin needs an argument to establish that participants to putative
theoretical disagreements must know that the plain-fact view is true, hence
cannot be genuinely uncertain about what our legally fundamental norms
are. Dworkin supports this premise by attributing to his opponents the
claim (“the semantic sting”) that “the very meaning of the word ‘law’ makes
law depend on certain specific criteria, and that any lawyer who rejected or
challenged those criteria would be speaking self-contradictory nonsense.”57
In Hill, “past legal institutions had not expressly decided the issue either
way, so lawyers using the word ‘law’ properly according to positivism
would have agreed there was no law to discover.”58
But this attribution has fared poorly. Hart flatly insisted that there was
“no trace” in his work of the idea that his rule of recognition and associated
criteria of validity were baked into the word “law,” 59 and most
commentators have thought it plain that positivism is not in the business of
defining words.60 So the semantic sting cannot furnish what the challenge
from theoretical disagreements needs. And the challenge fares no better if we
replace Dworkin’s semantic claim with a conceptual one. It is no part of
Hart’s theory that it is part of our concept LAW, if not our word “law,” that
legal norms are grounded in judicial consensus.61
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note __, at 31.
Id. at 37.
59 See HART, supra note __, at 247.
60 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note __, at 31 n.49 (“if any argument is no longer worth
discussing, it is this one.”); KRAMER, supra note __, at 207 n.2.
61 What content Hart ascribed to our shared concept of law is surprisingly unclear given
his monograph’s title. My own view is that, insofar as we share a concept of law, its core is
that law concerns the set of norms delivered and sustained by legal systems, which are
artificial normative systems established and maintained by political communities and
designed to serve a potentially limitless range of functions, characteristically including
resolving disputes among community members and preserving public order. I think this
57
58
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1.4. A genuine problem for consensus: “too-little law”
If, contra Dworkin, the existence of “theoretical disagreements” causes
little trouble for Hart’s view that the practices that ground fundamental
legal norms must involve official consensus, a nearby argument that has
attracted considerably less attention does. I call this Dworkin’s challenge of
too-little law. The problem it poses for Hart is not that his account can’t
explain genuine and sincere disagreements about the fundamental legal
norms. It’s that when judges do disagree on the fundamentals, neither side
can be correct about what the law is. Even if Burger and Powell could have
held their conflicting views sincerely, neither could have been right.
According to the orthodox reading of Hart, whenever the relevant
officials (paradigmatically judges) fail to converge on some putative
“criterion of validity,” or whenever they agree that some criterion “counts”
but fail to converge on how it fits within the rule of recognition’s overall
logic, to that extent the rule is unable to perform its validating function.
Unfortunately, in mature legal systems we are most familiar with, these
failures of convergence are likely to be common. The worry looms
especially large in theoretical debates over American constitutional law.
Many constitutional scholars believe that such failures and gaps thoroughly
characterize American constitutional practice, that very few constitutional
disputes that reach the U.S. Supreme Court (and even the federal appellate
courts) are determinately resolved by criteria that enjoy near-consensus
judicial recognition.62 In consequence, Hart’s account seems to entail that
there is much less (constitutional) law than appears correct to many
sophisticated observers, even on reflection. This is the too-little-law objection:
if Hart’s account of law were correct, “it would follow that there is actually
almost no law in the United States.” 63 Even if hyperbolic, it’s not a
throwaway line. Dworkin pressed it for forty years.64

was close to Hart’s own view at times, see HART, supra note __, at 239 (explaining that he has
sought “to give an explanatory and clarifying account of law as a complex social and political
institution with a rule-governed (and in that sense ‘normative’) aspect”), and that he never
meant to reduce the concept of law to the union of primary and secondary rules. But I can’t
pursue these ideas here.
62 The most thorough study to reach that conclusion is Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of
Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1987), reprinted in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note __, as ch. 1. See also, e.g., Mark
Greenberg, Response: What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct? Legal Standards vs.
Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 124 (2017); Brian Leiter, Explaining
Theoretical Disagreement, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1224 (2009).
63 Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Posthumous Reply, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2096, 2116 (2017).
64 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note __, at 10; DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 350.
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To this critique, the usual responses are available: “not so!” and “so
what?” Among Hartians, Brian Leiter is perhaps the most notable
champion of the latter view.65 In his estimation, precious few controverted
questions of American constitutional law do have legally correct answers,
making what Dworkin thought a bug of Hart’s theory a feature. Leiter
could be right, of course. But how bitter is the bullet to be bitten depends
on how many considered casuistic judgments the diner would have to
abandon. For myself, I can only report that when playing judge, as it were,
it feels to me that there are legally right answers to a good number of
controversial cases. Many colleagues say the same. So I will treat too-littlelaw as a genuine challenge for positivists, at least provisionally. If positivists
cannot amend Hart’s account to make plausible that some legal
propositions are true despite the absence of near-consensus on their
truthmakers, that some legal rules exist despite absence of uniform support
for the principles that are their determinants, then Leiter’s response remains
available. But it will be a response of last, not first, resort.

2. From Hartian Positivism to Principled Positivism
I have argued that Dworkin has marshaled two troubling objections to
Hart’s version of positivism: that it cannot satisfactorily explain the
existence and operation of legal principles, and that it does not allow for as
much law as legal sophisticates believe there to be, even on reflection. If so,
what follows? Dworkin’s own conclusion, of course, is that we should
abandon positivism.
This Article pursues an alternative possibility. It is to revise Hart’s
account in a way that enables positivism (1) to accommodate genuine legal
principles that participate in the non-lexical determination of derivative
legal rules, and (2) to allow for fundamental legal norms to emerge from
legal practices that fall significantly short of consensus. Many leading
positivists have long believed that Hart’s account is too highly regimented
and that some loosening or reworking would be required to save

65

See Leiter, supra note __.

21

positivism.66 This is my effort to bring that less tightly structured vision into
crisper resolution.67
Here’s the preview. Fundamental legal principles are grounded in
practices more or less as ordinary social norms are: by dint of legal actors
taking them up in legal decisionmaking. Their scopes and relative weights
are grounded, dynamically, in argumentative legal practices. Individual
principles bear constitutively on the legal status of a token act or event—
that the act or event is legally permissible or impermissible, legally valid or
invalid, etc.—by exerting force toward one status or the other. The force
any one principle exerts is a function of two variables: the principle’s own
relative weight or importance within the legal system, and the extent to
which the principle is “activated” by the presence of legal practices or other
phenomena that the principle “turns upon” or makes legally relevant. The
all-things-considered legal status of a token act or event is determined by
the aggregate force of the activated principles (think vector addition) or by
more complicated functions that, like the principles themselves, are also
66 See, e.g., Soper, supra note __, at 514 ( “It may be that we have moved some distance
from the view that a ‘master test,’ capable of actually identifying with some precision all
standards relevant to legal decision, forms the core of a positivist’s theory.”); Frederick
Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 145,
150-51 (Sanford Levinson ed. 1995) (“In referring to the ultimate rule of recognition as a rule,
Hart has probably misled us. . . . The ultimate source of law . . . is better described as the
practice by which it is determined that some things are to count as law and some things are
not.”); KRAMER, supra note __, at 205 (“[A] satisfactory theory of law has to include a much
better account of legal reasoning and interpretation than the account offered by Hart . . .”);
BAYLES, supra note __, at 170.
67 Dworkin anticipated and dismissed a view that some might think resembles the one
I’m presenting. After arguing that principles cannot arise by validation or by acceptance, he
offered this final possibility: “If no rule of recognition can provide a test for identifying
principles, why not say that principles are ultimate, and form the rule of recognition of our
law?” DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 43. The law of a jurisdiction would, on this view, be “all the
principles . . . in force in that jurisdiction at the time, together with appropriate assignments
of weight. A positivist might then regard the complete set of these standards as the rule of
recognition of the jurisdiction.” Id. “This solution,” says Dworkin, “is an unconditional
surrender. If we simply designate our rule of recognition by the phrase ‘the complete set of
principles in force’, we achieve only the tautology that law is law.” Id. at 43-44.
My version of positivism, like that of Dworkin’s imagination, holds that the complete
set of principles, with their relative respective weights, constitutes the fundamental legal
norms of a community. But that’s where the commonality ends. Principled positivism does
not treat the existence of such fundamental principles as a brute inexplicable fact, but as
metaphysically determined by the practices by which participants in a legal system take
them up in legal decisionmaking. Furthermore, rather than relying upon a “rule of
recognition” and the validation with which it’s associated, principled positivism maintains
that fundamental weighted principles determine derivative norms non-lexically. The view
could be wrong, and still wants for detail, but it does not approach a tautology.
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grounded in legal practices. Rules are reflections of the legal status of
properly described act or event types; they describe the curvature of legalnormative space that is effected by the aggregative force of the principles.
That is a highly condensed summary. The key differences between this
model and the Hartian model are two. They concern, first, how the
fundamental legal norms—principles—bear on non-fundamental legal
notions (in a non-lexical, aggregative manner), and second, how those
fundamental legal norms are themselves grounded in practices (by being
taken up by legal actors and thereby embedded in the legal materials, rather
than by convergent agreement or acceptance). These two differences are
what enable the full account to meet these two challenges that hamstrung
Hart’s theory. See figure 5.
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This section develops the picture in four steps. Section 2.1 explains how
fundamental contributory norms—legal principles—are grounded in
practice. Section 2.2 explains how these fundamental principles, along with
all the facts, practices, or phenomena that they reference or make legally
relevant, combine by non-lexical aggregation to determine the legal
properties (such as being legally permitted or prohibited, or legally valid or
invalid) that attach to token acts and events, and, in so doing, to determine
derivative and “summary” legal rules. Section 2.3 explains why the
determination function between fundamental principles and summary
rules is what it is, or in virtue of what it has the particular form or content
that it does. Section 2.4 adds a further clarification about legal rules,
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contrasting the summary conception introduced in Section 2.2 with a
second conception of “promulgated” rules. It explains how promulgated
rules contribute to summary rules by operation of the fundamental legal
principles.
2.1. How legal practices ground legal principles
A legal principle exists in legal system S in virtue of being “taken up” in
a legally significant speech act that purports to invoke and rely upon such
principle, by a legal agent or institution.68 That’s the basic idea, though of
course it puts matters too simply. Let me say a little more about both the
who and the how.
What determines whose behaviors count, and to what relative degree,
is not a brute fact constant across all legal systems, but is itself a
consequence of the recognitional attitudes and behaviors of members of the
legal-normative community. Those persons who play privileged roles in
the determination of the fundamental legal norms are those whom other
participants in the practice recognize as having privileged lawdetermination roles. So whose speech acts matter, and how much they
matter, is largely a product of who members of the community take to
matter. Think fashion. Whose fashion decisions matter is determined by
those persons whom others in the fashion community (or proto fashion
community) take to have capacity to set the fashion norms.
Legal actors disagree about our principles, both synchronically and
diachronically. It’s implausible that the single invocation of a putative legal
principle by a single actor in the face of opposition is sufficient to render the
putative principle a principle of the system, or sufficient to endow the
principle with the same importance as possessed by a principle that enjoys
broad, longstanding, and durable support. So we ultimately need some
handle on how patterns of acceptance and rejection, skepticism and
enthusiastic embrace, all bear on the configuration and importance of the
resulting principle.
While I am certain that the answer is complex, I do not think there is any
deep mystery about how fundamental norms can be grounded in social
practice, even as particulars elude us. As Rolf Sartorius suggested decades
ago, fundamental norms arise within an institutionalized normative system

68 Cf. Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 166 (2002) (arguing that, for “common lawyers . . . , the law in its
fundament was understood to be not so much ‘made’ or ‘posited’—something ‘laid down’
by will or nature—but rather, something ‘taken up,’ that is, used by judges and others in
subsequent practical deliberation”).
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when they have the type of “institutional support” to which Dworkin drew
our attention: they are “embedded in or exemplified by numerous
authoritative legal enactments: constitutional provisions, statutes, and
particular judicial decisions.” 69 The more a principle is taken up by the
relevant actors, and the more that subsequent legal decisions rely upon and
reinforce the principles or the decisions they are understood to underwrite,
the more secure is the principle’s status as a legal norm of the system.
Because I cannot improve significantly upon this description, I want
only to highlight two points. First, this is a positivist account because
embeddedness is an explanatory, not justificatory, notion. It concerns, in
some fashion, what judges (and others) do accept or how they do reason,
not what they should accept or how they should reason.70 Second, for a
standard to be embedded in the legal materials does not require that it enjoy
anything approaching the near-consensus support that Hart required,71 and
that some theorists hostile to the possibility of distinctly legal principles
have thought essential to positivism. 72 As C.L. Ten emphasized, an
intelligible version of positivism may tolerate “considerable disagreement
among judges about what rules and principles are embedded in the legal
sources.” But it is nonetheless “dependent on social practice—the practice
of recognizing constitutional provisions, legislative enactments and judicial
decisions, as well as what is embedded in them, as legal standards.” 73
Indeed, “[t]here is no important difference” between how Dworkin would
assess fit “and the view of the legal positivist who extracts legal principles
from legal sources in the manner [just] suggested. . . . Both appeal from the
settled and explicit rules to what is embedded in them.”74
Sartorius, supra note __, at 154-55. See also: ROLF SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT AND
SOCIAL NORMS (1975) (“[A] principle is relevant if and only if, and to the degree to which, it
enjoys what Dworkin aptly calls ‘institutional support.’”).
70 Dworkin fails to appreciate this possibility in his response to Sartorius in The Model of
Rules II. See DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 66-68.
71 See e.g., Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1355 (2017)
(“under Hart’s view, where there is no consensus, there is no law”). To be sure, as Matthew
Kramer has emphasized, Hart did allow for disagreement among officials regarding matters
of detail. But Kramer’s point is that failures of consensus on details do not undermine the
rule of recognition in its entirety, not that criteria unsupported by near-consensus can
nonetheless form part of the rule of recognition or have legal force. KRAMER, supra note __,
at 84-88. That is, Kramer does not deny that, on the Hartian model, derivative norms cannot
be grounded in practices that involve dissensus.
72 See Alexander & Kress, supra note __, at 767-68.
73 Ten, supra note __, at 530.
74 Id. at 532. When further explicated, the notion of embeddedness will rely on some
elements of coherence, and support some versions of coherence theories of law. See
SARTORIUS, supra note __, at 196-99. But I tread cautiously here, for existing coherence-based
69
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To appreciate the difference between a model in which the social-factual
grounds involve the taking up and embedding of principles (mine) and one
that requires judicial near-consensus (Hart’s), consider the familiar
(putative) principles of American equal protection law customarily termed
colorblindness and anti-subordination. They are frequently arrayed against
each other in concrete legal disputes, especially concerning state-mandated
preferences for racial minorities, making it possible, if not probable, that
neither has ever attracted support from, or been accepted by, a super
majority of judges or other legal elites. If legal principles depend for their
existence on something approaching full agreement among members of one
or another class of legal actors, then neither colorblindness nor antisubordination (however the latter may be glossed) would qualify as a
principle of American law.
But most constitutional lawyers would intuit that that’s the wrong
lesson. On the alternative Sartorius-Ten account, both are principles of our
law. Each is a principle in virtue of having been invoked, relied upon, or
used, as legal justification for judicial rulings. And each has become further
embedded in our law to the extent that the decisions that have taken it up
serve as support for additional judicial decisions, or are approved and
championed by other legal (and popular) elites. Broadly, then, q may be
grounded not only in acceptance or invocation of q itself, but also in
acceptance, as legally correct, of decisions or rulings that q is understood to
explain. In such fashion does a principle become embedded in the law,
regardless of whether a head count would establish that nearly all judges
accept it.
The most common worry about this part of the picture is not that
positivist legal norms cannot be embedded in this (admittedly gestural)
manner, but that such norms cannot have the dimension of weight. This
was the chief objection to positivist legal principles that Larry Alexander
and Ken Kress advanced in their aptly titled article, Against Legal Principles.75
As they would summarize: “we cannot establish principles by agreement
because we cannot establish their weights by agreement.”76

theories of law reflect, at turns, both unclarity and disagreement regarding the particular
relata that must be brought into coherence. See generally Ken Kress, Coherence, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 36 (Dennis Patterson ed. 2d ed.
2010); Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, A Revision of the Constitutive and Epistemic Coherence
Theories in Law, 14 RATIO JURIS 212 (2001). See also Susan Hurley, Coherence, Hypothetical Cases,
and Precedent, 10 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 221 (1990).
75 Alexander & Kress, supra note __, at 761-64.
76 Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Replies To Our Critics, 82 IOWA L. REV. 923, 925 (1997).
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Two responses. The first is technical. As we will see in Section 2.2, my
account, unlike Dworkin’s, does not require that the principles have varied
weights. It could be that all fundamental principles have equal weight. All
that is required is that their manner of determination (D2) is aggregative or,
in any event, non-lexical.
In fact, though, I believe that fundamental principles often do vary in
importance or weight. Thus the second response. Alexander and Kress
explicitly assume a form of positivism in which fundamental legal norms
can arise only by agreement or consensus about that fundamental norm.77
Once we soften this supposed requirement, as the Sartorius-Ten picture
proposes, then it is no longer difficult to envision rough weights emerging
from judicial practice. As I have elsewhere argued:
The weights of principles, like their contents or contours, are
brought about by members of the legal community taking them
up and deploying them in legal reasoning and decisionmaking.
Weights are relative to one another, and are given by what
members of the legal community say about them and how they
use them. They are also conferred, as it were, by battle—by the
rules that are adjudged victorious, and thus made so, when
principles press in opposing directions.78
Weights conferred in this manner will be rough at best (think: slight,
moderate, weighty, very weighty, or nearly conclusive; not 12 or .68), and
change in organic fashion that is usually gradual. A principle’s relative
weight ebbs and flows, much as its contours constrict and expand.
Compare the principles that partially constitute a person’s psychological or
deliberative profile. Each of us acts upon a different bundle of ethical and
practical principles—principles that favor keeping promises, trying new
experiences, planning for the future, promoting justice, respecting one’s
elders, and so forth. The principles that make out an individual’s
psychological profile are not arrayed in a tightly structured hierarchy, let
Alexander & Kress, supra note __, at 767 & n.106.
Mitchell N. Berman, For Legal Principles, in MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES:
ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER 241, 254 (Heidi Hurd ed., 2019). The gist of
my argument there is that Alexander and Kress marshal forceful objections to Dworkin’s
picture of legal principles as suboptimal moral principles that morally justify legal rules and
outcomes, but score no damage against a positivist picture in which legal principles,
grounded in social facts, participate in the metaphysical determination of legal rules.
Broadly similar verdicts are reached in Brian Leiter, Explanation and Legal Theory, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 905, 906 (1997) (arguing that Against Legal Principles “is actually devoid of any
arguments against the existence of legal principles”); Gary Lawson, A Farewell to Principles, 82
IOWA L. REV. 893 (1997).
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alone once and for all. But they must exhibit a nontrivial degree of stability
and consistency to underwrite personal integrity—in the sense of
coherence, not moral worth. The same is true of legal systems, which is one
kernel of truth underpinning Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.
Return to our equality principles colorblindness and anti-subordination. If
the disputes in which the two pull in different directions are reliably
resolved in favor of colorblindness (assuming that other relevant principles
are in rough equipoise), that very pattern of decisions would make it the
case that it is (for the time being) the weightier principle.
2.2. How legal principles make legal rules
We now reach a further objection to a positivist picture that
accommodates, let alone foregrounds, non-lexical determination—not that
legal practices can’t deliver variably weighted principles, but that such
principles as they may deliver cannot combine to determine anything
resembling rules. The concern is just another instantiation of the demand
that has been made of normative pluralists of all stripes, from W.D. Ross to
Isaiah Berlin to Philip Bobbitt: to explain how the all-in derives from the
contributory. 79 In the case of principled positivism, the challenge is to
explain how legal “principles” (legal norms with possibly variable weights,
grounded directly in practices of legal participants) combine to constitute
or determine legal “rules” (determinate legal norms not directly grounded
in taking-up practices) if not by collectively constituting a set of (necessary
and) sufficient conditions. Baude and Sachs formulate this challenge to a
preliminary sketch of my account vividly, wondering how a large number
of variegated norms with diverse weights can determine or constitute more
determinate legal norms (rules) “rather than merely make soup.”80
The obvious answer, one I’ve been previewing for many pages, is “by
aggregation.” Rules and principles are types of norms; norms are kinds of
forces or, at a minimum, can be fruitfully analogized to forces (they push or

Think of “the priority problem” that Rawls worries bedevils all forms of
“intuitionism.” JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE chs. 7 & 8 (1971). The same concern
underwrites doubts that non-classical accounts of concept structure are intelligible. See
Davies, supra note __; Margolis & Lawrence, supra note __.
80 Baude & Sachs, supra note __, at 1489 (criticizing Berman, supra note __); see also Larry
Alexander, The Banality of Legal Reasoning, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 517, 521 (1998) (“No one—
not even lawyers—can meaningfully “combine” fact and value, or facts of different types,
except lexically . . . . Any non-lexical “combining” of text and intentions, text and justice,
and so forth is just incoherent, like combining pi, green, and the Civil War. There is no
process of reasoning that can derive meaning from such combinations.”).
79
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press or weigh or favor); and forces can combine by force addition.81 This
is Stephen Perry’s approach. As Perry has explained, “the principles that
are relevant to a particular situation are assumed to be commensurable and
capable of being aggregated, along their dimension of weight, so as to
produce an overall balance of principles.”82
Imagine a legal-normative field defined by the poles “is legally
prohibited” and “is not legally prohibited.” Then consider any token act or
event, x, that is a proper subject of the predicates that define the field. Any
given legal principle, Pn, will have no bearing on the status of x, or will bear
constitutively for one of the polar properties or its opposite. The token x is
thus assigned the legal property or status that corresponds to the greater
net force of the principles.
Figure 6 illustrates this dynamic, where the height of a vector arrow
represents the principle’s relative weight, its direction represents whether it
militates for or against the legal permissibility of the conduct at issue under
the circumstances, and its length represents the extent to which the
principle bears toward one normative pole or the other given the relevant
facts. Here are several things one can read off the graphic: P1 and P3 have
the same “valence” with regard to x: they both bear toward its being
prohibited. P1 is a weightier principle than P3. P3 is more fully activated
against the permissibility of x than P1 is; it exerts more of its potential force
than P1 does. A two-headed arrow, representing principle P6, has no net
impact on the legal permissibility of x either because it exerts itself equally
in both directions at once or because it doesn’t bear at all.

See W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 28-29 (1930).
Stephen R. Perry, Two Models of Legal Principles, 82 IOWA L. REV. 787, 788 (1997). See
also Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV.
913 (1989).
81
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Non-lexical determination of rules by principles (fig. 6)

A legal rule is a description of the legal status of a contiguous stretch of
tokens that share the same legal status. It reflects the normative status of an
act type, where that status is derivative of the like statuses of all the tokens
of that type. If [x1 is prohibited] and [x2 is prohibited] and [xn is prohibited],
there will be some description of the act type X for which it is true that [X is
prohibited]. The rule [X is prohibited] is the summary of a range of
instances of [xn is prohibited] where each token prohibition obtains in virtue
of the net bearing of the fundamental principles on xn. On this view, says
Perry, a rule “is regarded as nothing more than a device of convenience, a
kind of aide-mémoire for recording the perceived aggregate consequences of
the various principles that bear on the resolution of a specific kind of
dispute.”83
Perry is an anti-positivist. But nothing about the summary picture of
rules just sketched is obviously uncongenial to positivism. The supposed
trouble for positivism arises when we return to the problem of weights. The
objection now becomes, not that principles can’t accrue weight or
importance in the way described in Section 2.1, but that, as that discussion
emphasized, such weights can only be rough, and that we need more
determinacy if principles can jointly determine rules as the summary
83

Perry, Judicial Obligation, supra note __, at 225.
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conception envisions. Perry encourages this line of argument, noting that
“it is difficult to see how custom could be sufficiently nuanced as to be able
to assign determinate weights to individual principles.”84
Whether his doubts are well-founded depends on how determinate
principles’ respective weights must be, and the answer to that question is
supplied by functional considerations: the weight of principles must be as
determinate as need be for principles to do their job tolerably well. So the
objection to a positivist picture of the determination of rules by the
aggregation or accrual of weighted principles reduces (nearly?) to the claim
that, on any reasonably contestable legal question, some principles will
press one way, some will press the other, and their net impact, and thus the
legal upshot, will too frequently be underdetermined, metaphysically and
epistemically. 85 Thus would principles require more finely specified
weights than practice can be expected to deliver.
I do not find this objection persuasive. For one thing, we should not
assume that a roughly equal number of principles will routinely bear for
and against competing candidate legal rules. In many cases, the sheer
number of principles pointing one way will dwarf the number pointing
against.86 As significantly, the total force that a principle exerts on a given
legal question is not determined exclusively by its weight. I have already
noted that the force a principle exerts in a given context toward a
determinate legal status (e.g., valid, prohibited, permitted) is a function of
two variables, not one: the weight of the principle, and the extent to which
the principle is (as I call it) “activated.”87 Take a possible legal principle that

Perry, Two Models, supra note __, at 794. As a second reason to doubt a positivist
account predicated on the accrual of principles, Perry also agrees with Dworkin “that legal
principles are in any event not treated by common-law judges as rooted purely in custom.”
Id. (citing DWORKIN, supra note 7, at 43-44, 64-65). But the fact that judges invoke moral
arguments when trying to establish that a putative principle is a legal principle of the
jurisdiction, or has this or that weight, does not prove that those arguments are good ones,
that they do go toward establishing what they purport to establish. As I argue in Dworkin
versus Hart Revisited, judicial practices ground principles, while the fact that judges believe
these principles are morally good causally explains the judicial practices that are the
grounds.
85 See, e.g., SARTORIUS, supra note __, at 193-94.
86 Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (arguing that the recognized “modalities” of
American constitutional argument usually align, or can be viewed as aligning, even in hard
cases). I’ll return briefly to Fallon’s claim about American constitutional practice at the close
of section 3.3.
87 Cf. Robert Alexy, Formal principles: Some replies to critics, 12 INT’L J. CON. L. 513 (2014)
(defining the “concrete weight” that a principle exerts in context as a function of, inter alia,
84
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provides that historical practice matters. The total force this principle exerts
in favor of the putative legal fact [x is legally permitted] will depend on how
long and widespread the practice of xing has been. A principle that gives
effect to some communicative content of a text activates more fully the
clearer that content is. Weight may be constant across contexts—though not
over time88—while activation is context-sensitive. Given the role played by
context-variant activation, the net force of principles may well yield rules
determinately even when particular principles’ relative context-invariant
weights are highly uncertain—which is not to deny that some underdeterminacy, possibly substantial, will remain.89
The difference between what I am calling “weight” and “activation,”
though widely overlooked, is of great importance. Alexander and Kress,
the arch-critics of legal principles, assert that, “[b]ecause principles’ weights
vary in different concrete contexts, a complete account of principles requires
differing weights for every conceivable context.” 90 But that’s mistaken.
What’s required is that the force that a principle exerts can vary across
contexts, not that its weight does. An analogy: the mass of a body and thus
the gravitational force it has the capacity to exert is not contextually variant,
though the gravitational force that it does exert on an object in a given
context also depends on its distance to that object, which is context-variant.
This is a pregnant comparison, for artificial normative systems can be
conceptualized in terms of normative fields, analogous to gravitational
fields. Normative fields are created and sustained by a convergent practice
among participants or “subscribers” in more or less the way described by
Hart’s rule of recognition. Principles are constituted by the taking-up
behaviors of the system’s subscribers (or of some subset). Principles operate
within the normative field much as masses do within a gravitational field.
the principle’s “abstract weight” and the “intensity of interference” with the principle under
the circumstances).
88 This follows from the facts that principles, and their weights, are grounded in human
behaviors, and that human behaviors are inescapably dynamic.
89 To be clear, I am addressing the worry that the balance of principles will be underdeterminate in a great many cases—many more than would be consistent with widespread
judgments among sophisticates regarding the actual extent of legal under-determinacy. I
am not responding to Dworkinian anxiety that there will be some under-determinacy and
therefore that the picture I’m presenting leaves some room for judicial discretion. I share the
common judgment that a positivist “can reject the model of rules, yet accept the doctrine of
judicial discretion.” Lyons, supra note __, at 422. Just as significantly, the thought that
discretion begins where already determined law ends is untrue to the relevant
phenomenology. When struggling toward the law in difficult cases, judges do not
experience a clean divide between (1) trying to ascertain existing law and (2) creating new
legal norms. See Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, supra note __, at 156-60.
90 Alexander & Kress, Replies, supra note __, at 924-25.
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Rules are articulable descriptions of stretches of the curvature of the
normative field that the principles effect.91
One final analogy, this time from the study of Multiple-Criteria Decision
Analysis (MCDA) and Multi-criteria Analysis (MCA) in such fields as
decision theory, management science, and fuzzy logic. As the names
suggest, MCDA and MCA concern how decision makers should reach
overall assessments about the relative value ranking of options that
implicate a multiplicity of criteria, factors or attributes.92 Although not yet
well known in law and legal theory, the field is many decades in
development and its tools and methods are routinely deployed across
industry, finance, science, and governance, on questions ranging from how
to build an investment portfolio to where to locate an airport to which
students to admit to a graduate program.93 The simplest and most widely
used of all MCDA and MCA models is simple additive weighting (SAW)
and its variants. 94 Wrinkles aside, a decisionmaker employing SAW
“directly assigns weights of relative importance to each attribute” and then
obtains a total score “for each alternative by multiplying the importance
weight assigned for each attribute by the scaled value given to the
alternative on that attribute, and summing the products of all attributes.”95
The simple model I adapted from Perry as an example of how principles
can aggregate to determine summary rules is little more than the conversion
of a powerful widely used decisionmaking protocol into a model of the
metaphysics of artificial normative systems.
2.3. On the determination of the determination function
The argument to this point explains how variably weighted norms
grounded in legal practice, by being taken up and further embedded, could
aggregate to determine decisive summary norms. But even if determination
I doubt that this model of determination is properly classified as aggregation, which
helps explain why I locate the critical distinction among modes of determination (Section
1.2) at a higher level of generality.
92 A useful introduction and overview is PAUL GOODMAN & GEORGE WRIGHT, DECISION
ANALYSIS FOR MANAGEMENT JUDGMENT (4th ed. 2009).
93 See BENGT LINDELL, MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS IN LEGAL REASONING 8-9 (2017) (noting
that “while the volume of literature in its own field of knowledge is extensive, there is very
little written in legal literature about MCA and fuzzy logic,” and speculating that the
literature’s relative formal and scientific language has impeded its reception by lawyers and
legal scholars).
94 See, e.g., Lazim Abdullah & C.W. Rabiatul Adawiyah, Simple Additive Weighting
Methods of Multi criteria Decision Making and Applications: A Decade Review, 5 INTL. J. INFO.
PROC. & MGMT. 39 (2014).
95 LINDELL, supra note __, at 48.
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of this sort is possible, is it actual? What would make it the case that
principles do aggregate in this fashion, either generally or in a given legal
system? After all, an aggregative system could take many forms. It could
incorporate thresholds or eschew them. It could involve more complicated
operators, such as the multipliers, enablers, and defeaters familiar from
current theories of practical reasoning. 96 It could be only partially
aggregative, including lexical features too. What makes it the case that a
given legal system S maps principles to all-in legal facts, and thus summary
rules, this possible way rather than that possible way? If it is true that R is a
rule of S if the aggregate force of principles favoring R exceeds the aggregate
force of principles favoring ¬R, in virtue of what would this be so? What
determines the determination function between fundamental norms and
derivative ones?
The answer, I think, has two components. The first traces, once again,
to insights supplied by an anti-positivist—this time Mark Greenberg.
Greenberg has persuasively argued in an important paper that it is part of
the nature of law and legal systems that the determination relationship
between practices (or practice facts, in the terminology that Greenberg
prefers) and legal norms must satisfy what he calls “the rational-relation
doctrine,” which provides that “the content of the law is in principle
accessible to a rational creature who is aware of the relevant law
practices.”97 Macrophysical properties such as hardness and brittleness are
determined by microphysical facts involving the arrangement of a
substance’s molecules. That determination relationship can be brute: it can
be a fact about the universe that this or that arrangement of molecules
grounds this or that macrophysical property even if it were opaque to us
why this arrangement determines that property. Law, Greenberg argues, is
different. “[T]hat the law practices support these legal propositions over all
others is always a matter of reasons—where reasons are considerations in
principle intelligible to rational creatures.”98
Greenberg emphasizes that the rational relation doctrine does not itself
resolve the debate between positivism and anti-positivism: “it is an open
See generally LORD & MAGUIRE, supra note __; DANCY, supra note __, ch. 3. The example
best known to legal scholars is Raz’s “exclusionary reasons,” JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON
AND NORMS 35-48 (1975) (1990).
97 See Greenberg, supra note 1, at 237.
This article’s title signals both my debt to
Greenberg’s and the nature of my disagreement.
98 Id. As he further explains: “lawyers believe that when they get [the law] right, the
reasons they discover are not merely reasons for believing that the content of the law is a
particular way, but the reasons that make the content of the law what it is. . . . . [L]awyers
take for granted that the epistemology of law tracks its metaphysics. And the epistemology
of law is plainly reason-based.” Id. at 239.
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question whether there are non-normative, non-evaluative facts that could
constitute reasons for legal facts—and indeed whether there are value facts
that could do so.”99 I agree. But he is driven to anti-positivism because, he
believes, “[i]t turns out that value facts are needed to make intelligible that
law practices support certain legal propositions over others.”100 That I deny.
I see no reason to anticipate that determination of legal facts by aggregation
of principles grounded in practice leaves an intelligibility deficit.101 Rather,
the rational relation doctrine itself—understood as an aspect of law’s
nature—strongly favors some mappings over others. The more complex a
mapping, the greater it threatens the ability of participants in legal practice
to reason from the contributory to the all-in. Because no mechanism or
mapping is more intuitive or intelligible than simple aggregation (there is a
reason why SAW is widely heralded as the most user-friendly and “robust”
of MCA models102) we might expect it to be the default mode in a complex,
comprehensive and decentralized legal system.
Second and notwithstanding, to describe simple aggregation as the
likely default in a mature, complex, and decentralized legal system is not to
deny that such a system could incorporate other mappings. I suspect that
they can and do. What determines the particulars of a mapping are the
same broad type of practice facts that ground the principles themselves.
That is, the taking-up behaviors of participants ground not only the
fundamental principles of a legal system, but also the “meta-principles” that
bear on their interaction. Or, to shift terminology, helping to establish the
particular mapping of principles to rules that obtains in a given legal system
is one possible function of what Andrei Marmor calls “deep conventions.”103
For example, if a “meta-principle” or “deep convention” were to arise in S
to the effect that there is a uniquely right legal answer to (almost) all legal
questions, that would have a bearing on how principles in S accrue: it would
exert pressure toward mappings that facilitate more determinate rules and
against mappings that would yield greater indeterminacy. This is why
figure 5 depicts practices as playing a role in the determination, not only of
fundamental legal principles, but also of the determination function that
maps such principles to derivative legal rules.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 240.
101 Here I am in broad agreement with Chilovi & Pavlakos, The Explanatory Demands of
Grounding in Law, supra note __. I interpret Greenberg as arguing for explanation in their
“weak sense,” and I share their judgment that positivism can supply it.
102 See, e.g., Lindell, supra note __, at 47.
103 See generally ANDREI MARMOR, SOCIAL CONVENTIONS: FROM LANGUAGE TO LAW ch. 3
(2009).
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These practices, moreover, are responsive to ordinary human needs and
interests. As a thought experiment,104 suppose that legal system S begins
life with only a single determinant at the fundamental legal level—that is, a
single determinant that is directly grounded in practices: [for all p, p is a
rule of S if the constitutional text says p (or if p follows from what the text
says)]. It is exceedingly unlikely that a mature or complex legal system will
recognize only a single legal factor. This is because some legal rules that
arise by application of a single factor will prove unacceptable to most judges
(or, they will be unacceptable to many citizens, and judges change their
practices in response to social unrest or dissatisfaction when it exceeds a
certain level). Suppose, for example, that what the text says yields legal
rules such as [states are permitted to racially segregate the public schools]
or [states are permitted to establish official churches] or [the federal
government lacks power to regulate sources of air pollution]. Discomfort
with such outcomes can be sufficiently broad and intense to cause judges to
recognize and accept additional factors. The system will evolve from
recognizing a single factor to recognizing a plurality of factors, such as, for
purposes of illustration: [what the text originally meant], [what the text
means to an ordinary contemporary reader], [what the authors of the text
intended to do or accomplish], [what our stable practices have been], [what
the courts have held], [what justice requires], etc.
If this is right, the next question concerns what will be the character or
mode of the function that maps the plurality of factors to decisive legal
norms in a system that has, in virtue of the speech acts of the relevant legal
actors, established a plurality of fundamental legal determinants. The
standard view among legal positivists, following Hart (or their reading of
Hart), is that the plurality of grounds are necessarily arrayed into a lexical
ordering, which can be represented as a complex if-then statement. 105 I
draw attention to the alternative possibility that the factors are weighted
and determine derivative legal norms by aggregate force, akin to the way
that Simple Additive Weighting is understood to underwrite or recommend
a decision. No doubt the mix that emerges in any legal system is contingent
on a great many variables—size and heterogeneity of the population,
Cf. HART, supra note __, at 100-01.
Some orthodox positivists will object that this reading of Hart is a misreading, and
that his notion of “validation” did not presuppose what I have called lexical determination.
I address this objection elsewhere, noting that many theorists are skeptical that non-lexical
determination is workable and that, if Hart meant to embrace it neither he nor his followers
have addressed those concerns. See Dworkin vs. Hart Revisited, supra note __, Section 4.3. In
any event, I’m more interested here in the state of jurisprudential thinking than in Hart
exegesis. See supra note __.
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responsiveness of the legal system to the populace, age of the system, scope
of the system’s regulatory reach, amenability of the central legal
instruments to prompt purposive change, and so forth. You can speculate
as well as I about what practices are likely to emerge under what conditions.
But one advantage of the non-lexical model warrants emphasis: it
demands less coordination among the participants whose behaviors ground
the determination. Lexical determination requires that any condition
sufficient to confer legal status must enjoy clear majority endorsement or
acceptance, else two contradictory rules could both be valid law. Were
acceptance by a (substantial) minority of judges sufficient to ground the rule
that p is the law if C1, and acceptance by a different (substantial) minority
sufficient to ground the rule that q is the law if C2, then p and q would both
be the law if C1 and C2 jointly obtain even if p are q are mutually
incompatible. That would be untenable. Nonlexical determination by
weighted principles can deliver law when practices are less uniform. If a
minority of judges take up, thus ground, principle P1 and a different
minority of judges take up, thus ground, a conflicting or inconsistent
principle P2, the consequence is only that they might cancel each other out
in a given case, each rendering the other constitutively inert. The conflicting
principles would not thereby determine conflicting normative verdicts, as
would be true of lexical determination. This is important because it shows
that it’s no happy accident that principled positivism can address both
Dworkinian challenges to Hart’s version. While opening positivism to
nonlexical determination directly addresses Dworkin’s challenge from
principles, that adjustment at the same time permits a relaxation of the
demand that the fundamental legal materials enjoy supermajority official
support, which is a precondition to meeting the challenge of too-little law.
At this point, it seems to me, we have all the rudiments of a positivist
account of legal content adequate to meet Dworkin’s challenge from principles
and challenge of too-little law. Fundamental norms are grounded in speech
acts of legal actors. These norms gain rough variable weights in essentially
the same way that they gain their contents. Weighted norms can determine
the legal status of tokens by simple weighted aggregation, or by more
complicated interactions, as the nature of legal systems and the metaprinciples or deep conventions of the system collectively determine. Rules
reflect or capture a describable set of tokens that share legal status. Is this a
complete account? No. Does detail remain to be filled in? Sure. But that’s
true of every extant constitutive theory of legal content.106 The present task
106 Greenberg acknowledges that his own affirmative anti-positivist constitutive theory
(“the moral impact theory”) depends upon an account, not yet developed, of “the legally
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is not to try to prove out principled positivism, but to make it a plausible
and promising candidate, worthy of attention by jurisprudents and other
metanormative philosophers.
Scholars attuned to this account will find plenty of judicial support for
it. Elsewhere, I show that many and significant constitutional decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court are most perspicuously understood in line with this
model. 107 But the account is not particular to the U.S. legal system. A
particularly revealing recent example from Britain is the unanimous
opinion of the U.K. Supreme Court holding that Prime Minister Boris
Johnson’s advice to the Queen to prorogue Parliament was legally invalid,
rendering the purported prorogation a nullity.108 That conclusion rested on
two planks. First, “the United Kingdom . . . possesses a Constitution,
established over the course of our history by common law, statutes,
conventions and practice,” one which “includes numerous principles of
law, which are enforceable by the courts in the same way as other legal
principles.”109 Second, “the boundaries of a prerogative power relating to
the operation of Parliament are likely to be illuminated, and indeed
determined, by the fundamental principles of our constitutional law.”110 The
view, in short, is that the fundamental legal principles are embedded in
legal practice, and that they combine or interact to determine legal rules.
The Court could then ascertain what the rule governing prorogation is once
it identified what the U.K.’s fundamental constitutional principles are.111
2.4. Of promulgated rules and summary rules
The preceding analysis explains how principles aggregate to ground
legal rules via their power to determine, non-lexically, the legal status of act
and event tokens. You might worry that this gets things backwards, that
the legal property or status that a token act or event possesses should be a
function or consequence of the applicable legal rule, if there is one, not a

proper way” that legal institutions act to change “the moral profile.” See Mark Greenberg,
The Moral Impact Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1323 (2014).
107 Mitchell N. Berman, Our Principled Constitution, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 (2018);
Mitchell N. Berman & David Peters, Kennedy’s Legacy: A Principled Justice, 46 HASTINGS
CONST’L L.Q. 311 (2018).
108 R (Miller) v. the Prime Minister, [2019] UKSC 41.
109 Id. ¶ 39.
110 Id. ¶ 38 (emphasis added).
111 For a fascinating example from a civil law country, see the 2018 decision from
France’s Constitutional Council holding that the principle of fraternité barred prosecution
under a statute making it a crime to help migrants entering the country illegally. M. Cédric
H. et al., Decision No. 2018-717/718 QPC (July 6, 2018).
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determinant or input to the applicable legal rule. I address that concern here,
by distinguishing two kinds of rule, what I will call “summary” (or
“resultant”) rules and “promulgated” (or “contributory”) rules.
A summary rule reflects the actual normative state of affairs. The
preceding subsections explain its emergence. A promulgated rule, in
contrast, is an effort to change the normative state. To a first approximation,
the promulgated rule is what is said or asserted in a statute. Resultant rules
are summaries of the aggregate impact of principles, whereas promulgated
rules are among—possibly chief among—the facts upon which principles
operate.
Take a statute in legal system S that asserts that “q is prohibited.” If the
only fundamental legal norm in S provided that legal norms are all and only
what authoritative legal texts assert, then (conflicting assertions aside), it
would be a derivative legal rule in S that q is prohibited. There would be
no daylight between the promulgated rule and the summary rule, in which
case our inclination to treat the promulgated rule as the rule (unmodified)
would be wholly vindicated.
In complex mature legal systems, however, the fundamental norms will
be plural and (very likely) weighted. Almost certainly, fundamental
principles will provide that communicative contents of statutory texts have
great legal force. (The text will be among the “legally relevant phenomena”
that, as figure 6 represents, combines with the principles to determine
derivative legal facts.) Thus, and again, the status of tokens will be
substantially shaped by the promulgated rules. But because other
principles are in play, it might not be the case that every token’s status is
what the promulgated rule directs, in which case the summary rule will
depart, if only a little, from the promulgated one. This is why summary
(resultant) rules closely track, but are not identical to, promulgated
(contributory) ones.

3. Principled Positivism at Work
This section turns to concrete legal disputes. It aims to advance
understanding of principled positivism by illustrating how it can explain
legal content, even in disputed cases, and to better reveal some of the
account’s relative merits. Section 3.1 discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in TVA v. Hill, the “snail darter case” that we encountered in
Section 1.3, in connection with Dworkin’s ill-fated challenge from theoretical
disagreements. I’ll show, against Dworkin, that principled positivism makes
the disagreements in that case perfectly intelligible. Section 3.2 turns to the
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Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, a
textbook casualty of Dworkin’s too-little-law challenge. Here I show that
principled positivism can deliver law where Hartian positivism cannot.
Pivoting from constitutional rights to constitutional structure, section 3.3
examines the Court’s yet more recent decision in the “faithless electors”
case, Chiafalo v. Washington. It highlights that a plurality of fundamental
factors can generate determinate legal conclusions even when they press in
divergent directions and without assuming lexical ordering.
3.1. Snail darters revisited: explaining theoretical disagreements
The federal Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) is one of the nation’s
signature environmental protection statutes. It directs the Secretary of the
Interior to identify threatened species and their critical habitats, and
imposes extensive public and private obligations and prohibitions that such
designations trigger. Section 7 provides that all federal departments and
agencies shall “tak[e] such action necessary to insure that actions
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued
existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result in the
destruction” of such habitats.112
In 1967, The Tennessee Valley Authority, a federally owned corporation,
had started constructing a dam on the Little Tennessee River to generate
hydroelectric power and to promote regional economic development. Six
years in, scientists discovered in the river a previously unknown species of
perch, the snail darter. In 1975, two years after the Act’s enactment, and
eight years after construction of the Tellico Dam had commenced, the
Secretary of the Interior listed the snail darter as endangered and the Little
Tennessee as its critical habitat. The issue was thus posed: does the ESA
require that construction on the dam cease when nearing completion after
public expenditures of nearly $80 million?
In TVA v. Hill, a divided Supreme Court held that it does. As discussed
earlier (Section 1.3), that decision serves in Law’s Empire as a central
recurring example designed to cause trouble for positivism and to furnish
support for Dworkin’s own competing anti-positivist theory, “law as
integrity.” The thrust is that the disagreement between Chief Justice
Warren Burger’s majority opinion and Justice Lewis Powell’s principal
dissent (joined by Justice Harry Blackmun) is inexplicable on positivist
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16 U.S.C. § 1536.
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premises, but makes perfect sense if viewed through Dworkin’s competing
theory of law.
I argued earlier that Hartian positivists can explain the disagreement.
Because Hart’s theory does not require that the participants whose
behaviors constitute the rule of recognition understand its mechanics, both
Burger and Powell could have been genuinely unaware that neither side’s
“theory of legislation” could be legally correct given its rejection by the
other. But that doesn’t mean that the challenge is entirely inert. Even if
Hart’s account does not require that judges understand how his system
works, and even though knowledge can’t be attributed to them on purely
semantic bases, one might nonetheless think that if, as Hart’s theory
maintains, derivative legal rules are validated by criteria grounded in
judicial near-consensus, many sophisticated participants, including
Supreme Court justices, would ferret that out. So theoretical disagreements
of the sort that supposedly mark Hill are somewhat surprising and
disconcerting even if possible.
Principled positivism can explain these disagreements better. To see
how, we need a fuller understanding of the opinions than Dworkin’s
abbreviated and possibly misleading summary conveys. Burger did not
adopt what Dworkin called “the excessively weak version” of
intentionalism in statutory interpretation, pursuant to which judges are
obligated to follow clear “acontextual” statutory meaning unless “the
legislature actually intended the opposite result.”113 And Powell did not
reason that courts must avoid an absurd result unless it’s clear that the
legislature intended it. Instead, both opinions recognized the same three
principles as existing in our legal system and as at least potentially bearing
on the legal status of the token act. These principles concern communicative
contents of the statute, legal and application intentions of the enacting
legislature, 114 and the public good (as an ordinary person or legislature
would view it). Because principles lack canonical formulation, these, like
all, can be rendered in diverse ways. But here’s a first try: what the statutory
text means matters; legal intentions of the enacting legislature have force; absurd
results should be avoided. Perhaps the justices disagree about these principles’

Id. at 22.
For introductions to differences among types of intention—semantic, communicative,
legal, application—see Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783,
796-99 (2017).
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relative weights. More conspicuously and consequentially, however, they
disagree about the extent to which each principle was activated.
Let’s take the principles one at a time. The justices’ disagreement over
the meaning of section 7 is straightforward. As the majority saw things,
“the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require precisely
[that dam construction cease]. One would be hard pressed to find a
statutory provision whose terms were any plainer.” 115 Powell thought
otherwise. Agreeing with the majority that “[t]he starting point in statutory
construction is” the statutory text, he found the language “far from
‘plain.’”116 His thought (expressed somewhat obscurely) appears to be that
Section 7 would more clearly direct the result the majority ruled that it did
if it explicitly enjoined federal agencies to take action “necessary to insure
that actions authorized, funded, carried out, or completed by them do not
jeopardize” endangered species or their habitats. But that’s not what the
section says. Therefore, it “can be viewed as a textbook example of fuzzy
language, which can be read according to ‘the eye of the beholder.’”117
Now turn to the Justices’ views about congressional intent. This is more
subtle, and requires unpacking. Recall that the ultimate issue in a litigated
case is particular, not general; it’s about tokens, not types. In this case, the
issue was whether the ESA required cessation of the Tellico dam project.
What content would congressional intent have to have to underwrite an
affirmative answer? Consider three possibilities, in order of increasing
generality. Congress might have intended that section 7 would apply (a)
even to the Tellico Dam Project, (b) even to projects that are close to
completion at the time that the Secretary of the Interior lists a species as
endangered or its habitat as critical, or (c) even when its application would
incur great immediate or localized costs. All members of the Court agreed
that the Congress that enacted the ESA lacked any intention with content
(a) or (b).118 At the same time, the majority insisted, and the dissent did not
deny, that the enacting Congress did have intention (c).119 What divided the

437 U.S. at 173.
437 U.S. at 205 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117 437 U.S. at 202 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118 See 437 U.S. at 184; 437 U.S. at 207-08 (Powell, J., dissenting).
119 E.g., 437 U.S. at 177 (“The dominant theme pervading all Congressional discussion of
the proposed [Endangered Species Act of 1973] was the overriding need to devote whatever
effort and resources were necessary to avoid further diminution of national and worldwide
wildlife resources.”) (citation omitted).
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majority and dissent was whether intention (c) entailed or encompassed
intention (a).
Burger thought that it did because intention (a) plainly falls within
intention (b), and (b) does not differ in any material way from other
subclasses of cases that fall under (c). Powell thinks that the slide from (c)
to (b) (and thereby to (a)) is more fraught than the majority recognizes.120
Nearly completed projects comprise a subclass of cases captured by (c), but
one with distinctive features not shared by all subclasses of (c), namely that
the costliness, and thus potential absurdity, of abandoning nearly completed
projects is manifest. What should the government do in such cases? Spend
additional funds to undo what it had already done? Leave a nearly
completed but unusable dam standing, as a constant reminder to the
community of the costs it has already sustained for promised benefits that
will never materialize?121 Because abandoning nearly completed projects
might reasonably strike citizens and their representatives as more foolish or
costly than not starting them, notwithstanding the economic logic that
renders “sunk cost” reasoning fallacious, congressional intent (c) does not
entail congressional intent (b), therefore does not entail congressional intent
(a). It follows, according to Powell, that there was no actual congressional
intention relevant to this dispute—no intention either that completion of the
Tellico dam project would be illegal or that it would not be.122
So much for the opinions’ disagreements regarding the first two
principles or considerations: statutory plain meaning, and the legislature’s
See 437 U.S. at 207 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “nowhere
mak[ing] clear how the result it reaches can be ‘abundantly’ self-evident from the legislative
history when the result was never discussed”).
121 See 437 U.S. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[F]ew members of Congress will wish to
defend an interpretation of the Act that requires the waste of at least $53 million . . . and
denies the people of the Tennessee Valley area the benefits of the reservoir that Congress
intended to confer. There will be little sentiment to leave this dam standing before an empty
reservoir, serving no purpose other than a conversation piece for incredulous tourists.”).
122 Powell actually sends conflicting signals on just this point. Much of his analysis aims
to establish that Congress lacked an actual intention that the Act would “apply to completed
or substantially completed projects.” 437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting). But some
language suggests the stronger conclusion that Congress possessed an actual intention that
the Act not apply to such projects. See, e.g., 437 U.S. at 210 (identifying “strong corroborative
evidence that the interpretation of § 7 as not applying to completed or substantially
completed projects reflects the initial legislative intent.”) On balance, I think that the former
and weaker proposition better accords with Powell’s opinion as a whole. Note, for example,
his conclusion that “I had not thought it to be the province of this Court to force Congress
into otherwise unnecessary action by interpreting a statute to produce a result no one
intended.” 437 U.S. at 210-11. Had he really endorsed the more aggressive position
regarding congressional intent, this passage should have read “. . . to produce a result
contrary to what it intended.”
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legal intention. What about the third, avoid absurdity (or comport with common
sense)? Having concluded that the weightiest considerations do not clearly
resolve this dispute—they do not activate nearly as forcefully against
completion of the dam as the majority believed—Powell embraced avoid
absurdity enthusiastically.
While acknowledging this principle’s
subordinacy to the first two, Powell nonetheless found it greatly
activated.123
The majority is more circumspect, not surprisingly. Having determined
that the most important principles pressed forcefully and in concert against
permissibility, it didn’t need to examine the possible import of a palpably
less weighty principle. Still, there is some intimation in the majority opinion
that avoid absurdity would have some force in a dispute with respect to
which meaning and intent were more equivocal.124
In sum, here’s how the dispute looks according to principled positivism.
Burger believed that the “meaning” of the statute and the enacting
Congress’s legal intent are both pellucid and that both direct that dam
construction must cease. Whether or not this result would flout common
sense, the avoid absurdity principle could not possibly overcome the
combined force of the textualist and intentionalist principles. Powell
believed that the statutory meaning was much less clear than Burger did
and that Congress did not actually intend the legal results that Burger
claimed. At the same time, he thought, avoid absurdity pressed very strongly
in the other direction. Because the principles that militated against the legal
permissibility of completing the dam did so with much less aggregative
force than the majority believed, the principle that militated forcefully in
437 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“If it were clear from the language of the Act
and its legislative history that Congress intended to authorize this result, this Court would
be compelled to enforce it. It is not our province to rectify policy or political judgments by
the Legislative Branch, however egregiously they may disserve the public interest. But where
the statutory language and legislative history, as in this case, need not be construed to reach
such a result, I view it as the duty of this Court to adopt a permissible construction that
accords with some modicum of common sense and the public weal.”)
124 This too is ambiguous. Burger’s opinion can be read either as suggesting that avoid
absurdity is a subordinate principle of our legal system that can have effect when the actual
legal intention of the enacting legislature is uncertain, or as denying that it is a principle of
our legal system at all. Compare, e.g, 437 U.S. at 195 (contending that “in our constitutional
system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt
congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with ‘common sense and the
public weal’”) with 437 U.S. at 194 (observing that “Congress has spoken in the plainest of
words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of affording
endangered species the highest of priorities,” and asserting that judicial “appraisal of the
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside
in the process of interpreting a statute”) (emphasis added).
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favor of the permissibility of project completion could carry the day. Figures
7 and 8 represents these competing positions, cleaned up a bit.125
TVA v. Hill, per the majority (figure 7)

TVA v. Hill, per the dissent (figure 8)
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3.2. Same-sex marriage before Obergefell: delivering more law
Consider next whether states are constitutionally required to recognize
same-sex marriages on the same terms as they recognize opposite-sex
marriages. Call the affirmative proposition same-sex marriage. When the
Supreme Court took up the question, in Obergefell v. Hodges,126 many people
believed that the Court should rule for the plaintiffs on the (minimally
realist) ground that same-sex marriage was already true (though not
authoritatively declared to be true). Was it? Was this a compelling claim, or
even a plausible one?127
Recall my earlier contention (§ 1.2) that Hartian validation depends
upon satisfaction of any (complex) criterion that concordant acceptance
picks out as sufficient. As it operates in Hart’s account (and putting
defeasibility aside), q is a norm of legal system S if C1 or C2 or C3 or . . . Cn,
where each condition C can itself be a complex combination of conjuncts
and disjuncts and is grounded in the practices that make out the rule of
recognition of S.128
An orthodox Hartian sympathetic to same-sex marriage even prior to its
endorsement in Obergefell might reason along the following lines: q is a legal
norm in the U.S. if:129
C1 [the Supreme Court has held q in a non-overruled decision] or
C2 [q is the plain original meaning of a provision of the constitutional
text and no decision of the Supreme Court (not itself overruled)
holds or clearly says ¬q] or
C3 [the authors and ratifiers of the constitutional text intended to codify
q and the nation has observed a consistent practice of respecting q,
and both q and ¬q are comparably compatible with the ordinary

Some cleaning up or smoothing out is required by the uncertain and conflicting
features of the opinions, including but not limited to the matters flagged in notes ___ supra.
126 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
127 This section draws from Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note __, at 140608, and Berman & Peters, Kennedy’s Legacy, supra note __ at 366-68. Readers of those earlier
efforts will notice that the diagrams I use here to represent the bearing of principles on the
legal status of act or event tokens differs from the ones used in those earlier articles. As I
previously explained, the two representations are interchangeable, see Our Principled
Constitution, supra, at 1394 n.219. My instinct is that some readers will find the earlier
diagrams somewhat more intuitive, but that these are more faithful to the underlying
dynamics and preferable on balance.
128 For an argument that these criteria need not refer only to matters of “pedigree,” not
content, see Berman, Dworkin versus Hart Revisited, supra note __, at section 4.A.
129 See supra text accompanying note 38.
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meaning of the constitutional text and with all (non-overruled)
Supreme Court holdings] or
C4 [q is required by a posture of equal respect for human dignity and q
is not clearly contradicted by any (non-overruled) Supreme Court
decision] or
C5 [q best promotes human flourishing and is not contradicted by the
contemporary naïve meaning of any provision of the constitutional
text] or . . .
Cn.
The problem for any Hartian who believes that the ruling in Obergefell
was legally correct (and that a contrary ruling would have been legally
incorrect) is that the sufficient conditions that plausibly are supported or
recognized by a convergent consensus among judges—conditions such as
C1, C2, and C3—do not plausibly validate same-sex marriage, while
conditions that do plausibly validate same-sex marriage —conditions such as
C4 and C5—are pretty clearly not the object of a judicial consensus.130 Of
course, it could be that, before Obergefell was decided, same-sex marriage was
false. On the orthodox Hartian account, however, same-sex marriage is not
merely false, but obviously false, a non-starter. And many sophisticated
observers will find that conclusion highly doubtful.131 Principled positivism
would earn a feather for its cap if it could make same-sex marriage plausible,
even if not demonstrably correct.
The first step is to identify the fundamental legal principles that might
bear on this legal issue. This is lawyers’ work. But the very considerations
that a Hartian American constitutional lawyer thinks figure somehow into
internally complex validity criteria will often strike a principled positivist
as independent fundamental legal principles. Such principles will give (pro
tanto) legal force to: original and current communicative contents of the
ratified text, legal intentions of authors and ratifiers, judicial decisions,
federalism, stable and accepted political practices, moral principles
concerning equality, liberty, respect for human dignity, and so forth. These
principles obtain not because they are accepted by all or nearly all judges,

This exercise suggests why the Hartian rule of recognition is better understood as
picking out sufficient conditions (subject to vagueness and defeasibility) rather than
conditions that are both necessary and sufficient. Even were it plausible that a judicial
consensus has picked out some criteria as sufficient, there is patently no consensus among
American judges that those criteria are the only sufficient ones.
131 My general argument is not partisan; similar stories can be told about many
conservative decisions. See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note __, at 1393-1411.
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but because they have the type of “institutional support” 132 to which
Sartorius and Ten already drew our attention: they are “embedded in or
exemplified by numerous authoritative legal enactments: constitutional
provisions, statutes, and particular judicial decisions.”133
To get a flavor for how principles embed in legal materials and practice,
consider the legal principle respect human dignity. In his Obergefell dissent,
Justice Thomas diagnosed “the flaw” in the majority’s reasoning as being,
“of course, . . . that the Constitution contains no “dignity’ Clause.”134 True,
it doesn’t. But fundamental principles are extratextual, and the dignity
principle that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion rested upon was wellembedded in our constitutional law by the time Obergefell rolled around.
Kennedy himself had relied heavily upon the principle in a handful of
majority opinions that vindicated claimed constitutional rights of gay and
lesbian people. 135 But as Leslie Meltzer Henry has shown, the principle (or,
as she argues, a cluster of relatively distinct dignity-based principles that
share a family resemblance) has been taken up in several hundreds of
Supreme Court decisions over many decades and across the doctrinal
waterfront. 136 It has undergirded successful claims to freedom of
expression 137 and personal liberty, 138 and to protection from excessive
punishment, 139 unreasonable searches, 140 compelled self-incrimination, 141
discrimination on the basis of race 142 or sex, 143 and more. As Sartorius
See supra text accompanying note 48.
Sartorius, supra note 58, at 154-55.
134 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 735 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135 See U.S. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770-75 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 57476 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
136 Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011).
137 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (rooted in “the premise of individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests”).
138 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
139 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment “reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons”).
140 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (the Fourth Amendment proscribes
unreasonable searches and seizures because they are “offensive to human dignity”).
141 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination is founded on “the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity
and integrity of its citizens”).
142 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“race is treated as a forbidden classification
[because] it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry”).
143 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (sex discrimination is
forbidden because it “deprives persons of their individual dignity”).
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emphasized, “a fundamental test for law defined in terms of such notions
as coherence and institutional support obviously goes well beyond
reporting concordant judicial practice.”144
In short, let us suppose, the American legal system comprises many
principles that bear on same-sex marriage, either for or against. If the
principles came with finely individuated weights, it might be both true and
reasonably discoverable that their net force weighed for (or against) samesex marriage. But in our real world, the skeptic thinks, a model of rules
constituted by the cumulative impact of many weighted principles delivers
essentially the same under-determinacy as does the established Hartian
model in which rules are validated by a single master rule.
Yet this is precisely the skeptical conclusion that close attention to the
distinct attributes of weight and activation (§ 2.2) aims to dispel. In
particular, constitutional principles concerning the pursuit of happiness,
and concerning the state’s obligation to respect the inherent equal dignity
of all persons within its jurisdiction (which principles include, or lie
adjacent to, principles of anti-subordination), are activated very
substantially in favor of same-sex marriage: the ability to enter into the legal
institution of marriage with one’s life partner is of tremendous instrumental
value; and the exclusion of same-sex couples from this important and highly
salient legal institution significantly demeans, degrades, and insults gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people. At the same time, none of the principles that
plausibly weighed against same-sex marriage activated very substantially.
The constitutional text doesn’t clearly state that states are free to disregard
same-sex unions; nobody who played an important role in drafting or
ratifying portions of the constitutional text did so with an actual legal
intention to authorize states to withhold recognition from same-sex unions;
the most on-point judicial precedent was a one-sentence summary
dismissal145 (entitled to little weight on standard case law principles); and
so on. If this is approximately correct, the net force of constitutional
principles grounded in institutional practice metaphysically determined
same-sex marriage even before Obergefell was decided. (See figure 9.)

144
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SARTORIUS, supra note __, at 207.
Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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Obergefell, per principled positivism (fig. 9)

I do not claim that this brief discussion, and accompanying diagram, are
nearly sufficient to fully establish that same-sex marriage was a derivative
legal rule of American constitutional law even before Obergefell so held.
That’s a lengthy task, and for first-order constitutional scholarship, not legal
philosophy. Rather, by explaining how that plausibly could be, it
demonstrates how principled positivism differs from, and likely improves
upon, Hartian positivism with respect to the too-little-law objection. 146 The
Admittedly, even if one is persuaded that a model of determination by net vector
force yields a legally determinate rule in this dispute, while the orthodox Hartian model does
not, that still would not establish that it yields more determinacy all things considered; some
disputes that appear determinate on the Hartian account might become under-determinate
through the principled positivist lens. This is not something we can net out a priori. Still,
two points merit emphasis. First, see supra p.__, I do not rule out that the system includes
lexical arrangements as well. My account, albeit hardly simple, surely simplifies a yet more
complex reality. Second, by far the best way to get a good grasp of the workings, virtues,
vices, and plausibility of this competing account is to investigate a large variety of actual and
hypothetical legal disputes with an insider’s knowledge and perspective. I attempt some of
146
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example can thus serve as proof of concept even for those who disagree with
the constitutional bottom line it endorses.
Thirty-five years ago, the American constitutional theorist Richard
Fallon focused attention on what he dubbed the “commensurability
problem”: the fact that American constitutional practice recognizes a
variety of kinds of argument—arguments based on meanings of the text,
framers’ intentions, historical practices, values, and so forth—but lacks an
agreed upon means of reconciling them “in a single, coherent constitutional
calculus.”147 His proposed solution to the problem had two parts. First,
judges should “assess and reassess the arguments in the various categories
in an effort to understand each of the relevant factors as prescribing the
same result.”148 Second, if attempts to massage or strongarm the diverse
constitutional arguments into “constructive coherence” fails, judges should
rank the arguments hierarchically and reach the judgment that accords with
“the highest ranked factor clearly requiring an outcome.” 149 Before
elaborating and defending his own solution, however, Fallon flagged what
he thought a surprising gap in the literature: the absence of any “powerfully
argued balancing theory” that would deliver unique results from
discordant factors or principles without lexical ordering. 150 Without
favoring such approaches, he nonetheless thought they clearly merited
more attention than scholars had paid.151
Now, principled positivism is not exactly what Fallon was looking for.
Fallon presented his commensurability problem as a problem in American
constitutional law, not in general jurisprudence, and the theories he
contemplated—the “constructivist coherence theory” that he advocated as
well as the alternative “balancing theory” that he only imagined—are
proposed solutions to that problem. Even more significantly, Fallon sought
a “methodology” that judges could follow when engaged in constitutional
interpretation, whereas principled positivism is a theory of legal content.
Because these are theories about different things,152 principled positivism,
that elsewhere, see Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note __; Berman & Peters,
Kennedy’s Legacy, supra note __, but don’t pretend that my efforts to date are conclusive.
(Thanks to Ruth Chang for pressing me on this point.)
147 Fallon, supra note __, at 1190.
148 Id. at 1193.
149 Id. at 1193-94.
150 Id. at 1228.
151 Id. at 1229-30.
152 See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note __, at 1328-32 (distinguishing
“prescriptive” from “constitutive” theories of constitutional interpretation); Stephen E.
Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Procedure, 135 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2022)
(distinguish “decision procedures” from “standards”); Mitchell N. Berman, Keeping Our
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as such, cannot quite fill Fallon’s bill. That acknowledged, one would
expect there to be a road to travel from general jurisprudential theories of
legal content to jurisdiction-specific theories of proper judicial reasoning,
and the preceding discussion suggests that the road from principled
positivism to a theory of how U.S. judges should reason in constitutional
cases will be reasonably direct. Principled positivism is thus a general
theory of legal content that, if sound, supplies the jurisprudential substrate
for the “balancing theory” of American constitutional law that we have
solely lacked.
3.3. Shuffling off from Chiafalo: defying parsimony in pluralism
The constitutionality of state non-recognition of same-sex marriage is
highly controversial. Many or most readers will have strong and settled
views about whether Obergefell was correctly decided, judgments that may
be recalcitrant to new arguments or ways of seeing. For that reason, and
because more examples are better, it’s worth closing with a case less likely
to run up against—or along with—many strong priors. Let’s try the
Supreme Court’s 2020 decision Chiafalo v. Washington, which addressed
whether states are constitutionally free to penalize presidential electors who
vote for a candidate in violation of their pledge. I hope to persuade readers
that a principled positivist analysis is independently plausible and
compares very favorably to what the justices produced.
American citizens do not elect the President directly. Instead, they vote
for presidential electors appointed by the states who by expectation and
practice vote for the candidate receiving the most popular votes in the state
(or district). Starting in the early twentieth century, increasing worries that
electors might not respect their state’s popular vote led many state
legislatures to enact statutes requiring electors to pledge to vote for their
party’s candidate. The Supreme Court held such pledge laws constitutional
in its 1952 decision Ray v. Blair.153 Ray left open whether the state could
penalize an elector who violated their pledge.
Chiafalo presented that question. After the state’s popular vote went for
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, four Washington State electors
pledged to Clinton cast their ballots for non-candidates (former Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and Yankton Dakota elder Faith Spotted Eagle) in an
attempt, ultimately unsuccessful, to encourage their counterparts in states
that voted Republican to abandon their party’s candidate, Donald Trump.
Distinctions Straight: A Response to “Originalism: Standard and Procedure,” 135 HARV. L. REV. F.
__ (forthcoming 2022) (comparing the two sets of distinctions).
153 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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The four were each fined $1000 in accordance with Washington law. Three
contested the fines, arguing that the Twelfth Amendment conferred upon
them discretion, free from state interference, to cast their ballot as they saw
fit.
The lower courts split, more or less. The Washington Supreme Court
rules for the state. In a case coming from Colorado on broadly similar facts,
the Tenth Circuit ruled for the electors.154 It seemed like a hard case. If the
legal question it presented had a uniquely correct legal answer, it would
require careful thought and investigation to determine.
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge 9-0. Justice Elena Kagan
wrote an opinion joined by all the Justices save Thomas, who concurred. On
Kagan’s analysis, the case was easy, not hard. Acknowledging that Ray did
not resolve whether states could enforce a pledge via sanctions, the Court
concluded that two considerations supported an affirmative answer: “The
Constitution’s text and the Nation’s history.”155
Two provisions of the constitutional text are directly relevant: Section 1
of Article II, which provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint” Electors “in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof my direct”; 156 and the Twelfth
Amendment, which directs that the electors shall “vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President.”157 Starting with Article II, Kagan asserted
that “the power to appoint an elector (in any manner) includes power to
condition his appointment,” for example by providing that an elector must
be a state resident or registered voter.158 It follows, she reasoned, that “a
State can add, as Washington did, an associated condition of appointment:
It can demand that the elector actually live up to his pledge, on pain of
penalty.”159

The Colorado statute provided that if an elector cast a ballot for anyone other than
the person to whom they were pledged, that ballot would be invalid, the elector would be
removed and replaced with an alternative elector pledged to the same candidate. After
deciding Chiafalo, the Supreme Court upheld this scheme in a one-sentence per curiam
opinion stating only that the appellate opinion “is reversed for the reasons stated in Chiafalo
v. Washington.” Colorado Dept. of State v. Baca, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (2020). It seems to me that
whether states are constitutionally empowered or permitted to nullify ballots that are cast in
violation of an elector’s pledge is one substantial bridge further than whether they may
impose ex post sanctions, and presents a harder question. Certainly the framers, given the
centrality of prior restraints to the First Amendment, might have thought so. The question
deserved better treatment from the Court than it received.
155 140 S. Ct. at 2323.
156 U.S CONST. Art. II, §1, cl.2.
157 U.S CONST. Amdmt XII.
158 140 S. Ct. at 2324.
159 140 S. Ct. at 2324.
154
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Turning then to the Twelfth Amendment, Kagan made quick work of
the electors’ contention that the constitutional phrase “vote by ballot”
plainly connotes “freedom of choice,” and that “[i]f the States could control
their votes, the electors would not be ‘Electors,’ and their ‘vote by Ballot’
would not be a ‘vote.’”160 Not so, she said, citing cases where one might be
said to “vote” or to “cast a ballot,” even when voting as a proxy or on
instruction from a spouse or union leader. “[A]lthough voting and
discretion are usually combined,” Kagan concluded, “voting is still voting
when discretion departs.”161
After determining that Article II plainly authorizes States to elicit
pledges from electors and to penalize breach, and that the Twelfth
Amendment confers no right to the contrary, the Court’s opinion addressed
post-enactment history. It observed that in the very first contested
presidential election—the 1796 contest pitting the Federalist John Adams
against the Republican Thomas Jefferson—every elector but one cast their
ballot for their state’s choice. With the rise of political parties and the 1804
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, expectations that electors would vote
in accord with their selectors’ wishes strengthened by the end of the
nineteenth century that the Court could observe that, notwithstanding
initial expectations, electors had long been chosen “simply to register the
will of the appointing power in respect of a particular candidate.”162 To be
sure, this was practice, not law. “But to remove any doubt, States began in
the early 1900s to enact statues requiring electors to pledge that they would
squelch any urge to break ranks with voters,”163 a development that Ray had
held constitutional. Finally, starting around 1960, several states—
numbering fifteen by 2020—chose “to back up their pledge laws with some
kind of sanction.”164 Such laws, Kagan explained, “reflect[] a tradition more
than two centuries old” in which “electors are not free agents; they are to
vote for the candidate whom the State’s voters have chosen.”165 Admittedly,
there have been some exceptions: “some 180 faithless votes for either
President or Vice President . . . out of over 23,000” electoral votes cast.166
Dismissing those few instances as “anomalies only,”167 the Court concluded

140 S. Ct. at 2325 (quoting petitioners’ brief; internal quotation marks omitted).
140 S. Ct. at 2325.
162 140 S. Ct. at 2327 (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892)).
163 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
164 140 S. Ct. at 2322.
165 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
166 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
167 140 S. Ct. at 2328.
160
161

54

that “our whole experience as a Nation” supports the states’ power to
penalize defecting electors.168
Writing separately, Justice Thomas explained that he could not join the
Court’s opinion because he disagreed with its contention that Article II,
Section 1 empowers states to regulate as Washington had. Finding that the
text said nothing about whether a state may penalize defecting electors,
Thomas nonetheless concurred in the judgment on the strength of a default
rule that he had many years earlier discerned “embodied in the structure of
our Constitution and expressly required by the Tenth Amendment”: 169
“‘Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power,
that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by
necessary implication,’ the power is ‘either delegated to the state
government or retained by the people.’” 170 Figures 10 and 11 represent
Kagan’s and Thomas’s opinions graphically.

140 S. Ct. at 2326 (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 557 (2014)).
140 S. Ct. at 2333 (Thomas, J., concurring).
170 140 S. Ct. at 2334 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 847-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
168
169
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For our purposes, two things about the Court’s opinion stand out. First,
it is unmistakably pluralistic. It attends to precedent, text, and history, and
gives no indication that the latter two are ranked in a strict lexical ordering.
While, as we will see, the opinion overlooks many factors it should have
engaged with, its fundamental pluralistic character merits note—not
because that’s unusual, but precisely because it isn’t.
Second, and notwithstanding the opinion’s near-unanimity, its analysis
is, in the estimation of commentators from across the political spectrum,
markedly weak. 171 What it says about the factors it considers is largely
unpersuasive, and it ignores other factors whose legal relevance should
have been obvious—even if it was not obvious just how weighty those
factors are or which way they bear on this dispute.
See, e.g., Mike Rappaport, The Originalist Disaster in Chiafalo, Law & Liberty, Aug. 7,
2020 (calling Kagan’s opinion “awful,” and deriding its reasoning as “weak,” “feeble,” and
“contrived”); Guy-Uriel Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Chiafalo: Constitutionalizing
Historical Gloss in Law & Democratic Politics, 15 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 19 (2020) (arguing
that the issue “is much more difficult than Justice Kagan’s opinion lets on”); Vikram David
Amar, “A Backward- and Forward-Looking Assessment of The Supreme Court’s ‘Faithless
Elector’ Cases: Part One in a Two-Part Series,” Verdict, July 14, 2020 (observing, judiciously,
that the majority and concurring opinions “were not as well reasoned or careful as a matter
of constitutional craft as they could have been”).
171
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Start with the factors Kagan discusses: the meaning of the relevant
constitutional provisions, and post-enactment history. Kagan’s analysis of
the meaning of Article II, section 1, is unconvincing, largely for reasons laid
out in Thomas’s concurrence. As Thomas summarized: “determining the
‘Manner’ of appointment certainly does not include the power to impose
requirements as to how the electors vote after they are appointed . . . .”172 Few
scholars or justices agree with the default rule that Thomas rode to a
concurrence rather than a dissent. And rightly so. 173 But most
commentators on Chiafalo do agree that the majority played fast and loose
with Article II.174
They are not much friendlier to the Court’s Twelfth Amendment
analysis. Even allowing that “we might well say that [somebody] cast a
‘ballot’ or ‘voted,’”175 in Kagan’s unusual cases where “voters” implement a
choice dictated by another, we might well do so grudgingly, possibly
because no more apt terms come immediately to mind, and with actual or
imagined scare quotes. Plainly “elector” and “vote” connote discretion, if
they do not always denote it, and it is certainly plausible that that’s what
ordinary ratifiers would have understood the terms to mean when uttered
in this very constitutional provision.176 All the more so if, as Dean Vikram
Amar has argued, “the term ‘ballot’ in the Constitution refers to a secret
vote,” and that, by design, it “appears in the Constitution only in connection
with the Electoral College and House selection of Presidents when the
Electoral College fails to generate a winner.”177

140 S. Ct. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
The whole game is played by Thomas’s deployment of the modifier “necessary.”
Although his Term Limits dissent had proclaimed fidelity to Chief Justice Marshall’s
canonical opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), see Term Limits, 514 U.S. at
852 & n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting), the central thrust of McCulloch’s first holding was precisely
that the federal government’s powers extend beyond even those that arise by “necessary
implication.”
174 See, e.g., Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note __, at 19 (“The majority’s reasoning .
. . is not persuasive, even on its own terms.”); Amar, supra note __ (explaining why Kagan’s
interpretation of “appoint” “can’t be right as a general matter,” and adjudging her reading
of Article II “not particularly persuasive”); Keith E. Whittington, The Vexing Problem of
Faithless Electors, 2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 67, 87-89 (2020) (complaining that there is “a lot
packed into the notion of conditions on appointment that Kagan did not bother to unpack
and explain,” and agreeing with Thomas about the “awkwardness” of her approach).
175 140 S. Ct. at 2325.
176 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note __ (objecting that reflection on distant hypotheticals
“does not tell us about the meaning of the ‘voter’ in the context of the presidential election
that the Constitution describes”).
177 Amar, supra note __ (further explaining, persuasively, that “the time lag between the
selection of electors and the casting of their votes for President that the Constitution
172
173
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No more convincing is Kagan’s treatment of our historical practices. All
that the rarity of defections “necessarily shows is that electors (and others)
may have felt there is a moral or prudential duty for electors to defer—not
that they could be legally compelled (under pain of penalty or replacement)
to defer.”178 Moreover, “[t]he presidential electors agreed with Justice Kagan
that faithless voting should be an anomaly,” carefully explaining (with
some plausibility) why “the exceptional circumstances of the 2016 election
counseled that they act contrary to their pledges.” 179 The question isn’t
whether we have a tradition of treating the pledge with great moral
seriousness, it’s whether we have a tradition that recognizes, confers, or
partially constitutes a state power to penalize. On that question, the electors
could claim several historical practices on their side: “Congress has never
rejected a faithless elector’s vote in the final tally. Thirty-five states either
impose no restrictions on electors or require only a simple pledge, and the
ballots that many states provide electors seemingly anticipate elector
choice.” 180 Perhaps most fundamentally, “for the first 170 of the
Constitution’s 230 years there was no tradition of legal compulsion for
electors”181 even while elector defection, though rare, was not unknown.
Given all this, it’s hard to take seriously the Court’s contention that the
constitutionality of state laws that penalize electors for defecting (let alone
that treat “faithless” ballots as invalid)182 gains support from “our whole
experience as a Nation.” And it’s not wholly surprising, and a little telling,
that the opinion vacillates on whether the history establishes that the States
have the power they claim, or merely fails to establish that they lack it.183
As flimsy as are the Court’s arguments on the topics it takes up, equally
troubling is all that the opinion slights or omits entirely: arguments from
federalism, framers’ intentions, popular sovereignty, and pragmatism.

contemplates, does affirmatively argue in favor of some constitutionally guaranteed
discretion”).
178 Amar, supra note __.
179 The Supreme Court 2019 Term—Leading Case, 134 HARV. L. REV. 420, 426-27 (2020)
(citations omitted).
180 The Supreme Court 2019 Term—Leading Case, 134 HARV. L. REV. 420, 427 (2020); see also
Rebecca Green, Liquidating Elector Discretion, 15 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 53, 77 (2020)
(concluding, against the Chiafalo Court, that “evidence suggests that Electoral College norms
and practice routinely anticipate elector discretion and that institutional and popular
acceptance of elector discretion is widespread”).
181 Amar, supra note __.
182 See supra note __ (discussing Baca).
183 Compare 140 S. Ct. at 2328 (“Washington's law, penalizing a pledge's breach, . . .
reflects a tradition more than two centuries old.”) with id. (“the Electors cannot rest a claim
of historical tradition on one counted vote in over 200 years”).
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Take the structural principle of federalism first. One needn’t join Thomas
in believing that federalism describes a constitutional rule to accept that it’s
a constitutional principle. (Similarly, one needn’t like it to recognize it.)
However much force that principle might have exerted on this issue, the
interests of states qua states deserved some attention.
Consider next framers’ intentions. Hamilton and Jay had each praised
the electoral college in the Federalist Papers, specifically emphasizing that the
electors would be selected for their “discretion and discernment” and
would make their choices “under circumstances favorable to
deliberation.”184 Yet the Court was unmoved, noting that “the Framers did
not reduce their thoughts about electors’ discretion to the printed page. All
that they put down about the electors was what we have said: that the States
would appoint them, and that they would meet and cast ballots to send to
the Capitol.”185 But that seems a little too dismissive. “No one is arguing
that Hamilton’s belief here is binding like constitutional text,” Mike
Rappaport fairly complained. “Rather, the point is that Hamilton, who is
normally considered a persuasive contemporaneous interpreter of the
Constitution, apparently believed that the Constitution protected the
independence of the electors.” 186 Hamilton’s opinion is nowhere near
dispositive—either on the question of what his contemporaries believed or
intended, or on what the law is now. But clear discussions from the
Federalist are “hardly to be dismissed as irrelevant or unimportant.”187 And
while vastly changed circumstances—particularly the birth and growth of
political parties—might possibly rob the framers’ intentions of much legal
force, that conclusion also requires argument that the Court’s opinion does
not furnish.
Another structural principle oddly absent is popular sovereignty.188 It
should be obvious to all that one powerful objection to pledge-breaking by
electors is that it undermines the people’s power to select the president. Yet
popular sovereignty makes only a fleeting appearance, in the opinion’s very
The Federalist, Numbers 64 and 68.
140 S. Ct. at 2326.
186 Rappaport, supra note __.
187 Rappaport, supra note __; see also, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Cock-eyed Optimist Meets
Chicken Little: Jack Balkin on the American Future, 86 MO. L. REV. 555, 561 (2021).
188 The principle of popular sovereignty that I invoke here is related to but distinct from
the principle of majoritarianism that, as figure 9 shows, plays a role in same-sex marriage. To
a first pass, I take majoritarianism to be the idea that the policy preferences of a popular
majority should prevail and popular sovereignty to reflect the deeper notion that the people
hold sovereign power. See Berman, Our Principled Constitution, supra note __, at 1388 & n.204.
For a rough analogy, popular sovereignty is to majoritarianism (as I use those terms) as
strategy is to tactics.
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last sentence. A pledge law such as Washington’s, the Court concludes,
“accords with the Constitution—as well as with the trust of a Nation that
here, We the People rule.”189 Keith Whittington gently chided Kagan for
failing to “hit that theme even harder,”190 but it is generous to credit the
opinion with having hit that theme at all. All the Court says in this last
sentence is that, given that they have the constitutional authority to penalize
elector defections, states that choose to exercise it serve democratic
principles. True but trivial. What warranted emphasis yet received no
mention is that the constitutional rule the Court announced—which is to
say the constitutional power that it recognized—is partly constituted by the
principle of popular sovereignty (in the same way that it’s partly constituted
by principles of textual meaning and historical practice), not only consistent
with it.
As with popular sovereignty, so too with pragmatism. The justices’
worries about what “chaos” might unfold if states were incompetent to
combat electoral defections in a post-Trump world dominated oral
argument.191 Yet pragmatism is not awarded even the brief cameo afforded
popular sovereignty. 192 Is that not curious? Like popular sovereignty,
pragmatics seem plainly part of the story and for some justices nearly all.193
Now, it might be a less important or weighty principle than several others
that inhabit our constitutional ecosystem.194 At the same time, however, it
might be among the principles that were most substantially activated on
this legal question.

140 S. Ct. at 2326.
Whittington, supra note __, at 92; see also, e.g., The Supreme Court 2019 Term—Leading
Case, supra note __, at 429 (also criticizing the opinion for slighting popular sovereignty).
191 See, e.g., Amy Howe, Argument analysis: In a close case, concerns about chaos from
“faithless electors,” SCOTUSblog, May 13, 2020; Ian Millhiser, Supreme Court justices fear
“chaos” if members of the Electoral College can defy the popular vote, VOX, May 13, 2020 (“It is far
from clear how judges should decide this case based solely on the text of the Constitution
and its history. Yet, as several justices noted, there are strong pragmatic reasons not to
permit faithless electors, and those pragmatic concerns appeared likely to carry the day.”).
192 See, e.g., Adav Noti & Danny Li, Chiafalo v. Washington: Presidential Elections Are
Messy Enough Already, GEO. WASH. L. REV. ON THE DOCKET, July 12, 2020 (“Notably missing
from the Court’s holding was any direct reference to the disastrous consequences that a
contrary ruling would likely unleash. But those consequences nonetheless underlie the
Court’s reasoning.”)
193 See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW xiii (2010)
(arguing that “the Court must thoughtfully employ a set of traditional legal tools in service
of a pragmatic approach to interpreting the law”).
194 Although pragmatism and principle are often thought to be at odds, there is nothing
puzzling about a fundamental legal principle that gives legal force to pragmatic concerns.
189
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If these criticisms have any merit, one might wonder why the opinion
wasn’t any better. A kneejerk legal-realist hypothesis is that a more
forthright analysis would have made a different legal conclusion
inescapable, and the authors had non-legal reasons (political, ideological) to
favor the result the opinion reached. While we should always be open to
“attitudinal” explanations of the Court’s decisions, there are reasons for
skepticism here. The judgment was unanimous, and the opinion nearly so,
yet it’s hard to fathom the extralegal commitments that Kagan and
Kavanaugh, Alito and Sotomayor, Gorsuch and Breyer, would share. (If
they did all share a commitment that was integral to the result, maybe that
commitment was not extra-legal.) More significantly, the many criticisms
of Kagan’s opinion that I’ve sketched do not obviously add up to a victory
for the electors. True, the electors’ position would have been strengthened
by a fairer treatment of the text and history. But principles of federalism,
popular sovereignty, and pragmatism all favor the states, perhaps to
significant degrees. As figure 12 represents, 195 a more pluralistic and
refined analysis need not have generated a different holding, need not have
entailed that states lack the power they claimed to possess.

I intend this diagram to reflect the arguments already floated in the text. Although I
think it broadly on target—and significantly more plausible than either Kagan’s half-hearted
pluralism or Thomas’s nearly monist originalism—the question is a hard one, in my
judgment, and would require more research and thought. I invite readers to view this as a
depiction of how things might well be, constitutionally speaking, not as a confident assertion
that this is how they are.
195
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This picture yields the same constitutional rule as the majority’s (figure
10). The salient differences are that the majority recognized fewer principles
(or factors) and presented them as wholly aligned, not partially discordant.
In this respect, Chiafalo is wholly representative of the Supreme Court’s
handiwork. As Fallon observed, the Court’s constitutional opinions rarely
admit that legally relevant factors are in conflict. “Far more common are
opinions and arguments that, while emphasizing one factor more than
others, assert or imply that the most persuasive arguments within all of the
categories are consistent with a preferred conclusion.” 196 Fallon is right
about this. The question is what to make of it.
I think that it tells us little or nothing about the correct theory of legal
content, but a lot about judicial strategy and psychology. It’s not that
justices are unaware that constitutionally relevant factors—fundamental
legal principles—sometimes or often conflict, but that they are desperate to
196

Fallon, supra note __, at 1229.
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paper over that truth lest they excite anxiety (the public’s, and possibly their
own) that constitutional disputes are resolved by the exercise of judicial
discretion. (Witness Chief Justice Roberts’s unfortunate, but calculated,
judges-are-like-umpires analogy.) The majority opinion in Chiafalo lends
further credence to this hypothesis. It is unpersuasive not because it is
wrong on the constitutional bottom line (though it might have been), but
because it labors to maintain that all the legally relevant considerations were
singing in unison. They often aren’t, and it’s very doubtful that they were
in this case. A more careful and candid analysis of the constitutional
questions raised in Chiafalo and Baca thus jibes with what principled
positivism teaches: U.S. constitutional reality is richer, messier, and more
discordant than Supreme Court justices like to pretend—and constitutional
rules can emerge from this stew nonetheless.

Conclusion
What makes it the case that the law has the content that it does? Hartian
positivism holds that norms are “validated” as legal by satisfying sufficient
criteria that are picked out by, thus grounded in, a convergent practice
among legal officials that Hart termed the ultimate rule of recognition.
Principled positivism maintains, in contrast, that decisive and derivative
legal norms (“rules”) are (also) determined by the accrual or aggregation of
fundamental weighted norms (what Dworkin called “principles”) that are
grounded in their being “taken up” by legal practitioners in legal
decisionmaking.
Nomenclature aside, the critical differences are two. First, principled
positivism allows, as Hartian positivism denies, that the social-factual
grounds of fundamental legal norms (“principles” in one case, “criteria of
sufficiency” in the other) can be unspecifiable and characterized by nontrivial dissensus. Second, principled positivism provides that principles
“bear on” derivative norms in a weighted and aggregative fashion that
cannot be fully captured by the language and machinery of validation.
These two differences may strike some readers as modest. They are not. As
this Article shows, their payoffs are substantial, for they combine to defang
the two most forceful objections that Dworkin leveled against Hart’s own
account—that it cannot make sense of the existence and functions of legal
principles, and that it cannot determine nearly as much law as legal
sophisticates believe there to be. If this alternative (or modification) to
Hartian positivism is closer to correct, it makes a difference—not only to
legal philosophers, but to all who would understand, or ascertain, our law.
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